Office of the Historian

33. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, April 2, 1964.

Chester Bowles, whom you’re seeing at 5:30, is in good spirits and should be no problem. We’ve met his immediate needs within the guidelines you laid down earlier, and he’s not asking for anything more. So a friendly hearing and reassurance you’re backing him will fill the bill.

The Navy’s current phasing out of the old F–6A interceptor has fortuitously permitted McNamara to put together a minimal air package as a means of at least partly pre-empting Soviet SAM and MIG offers. It involves mainly 75 surplus F–6As. While not as good as the F–104s the Paks have (which will mute their reaction), the F–6 is plenty good enough to meet the ChiCom air threat. Total cost with spares, etc. would be only $15–25 million out of planned MAP (not extra). Alternatively, Indians can have two squadrons of F–5As, but not till 1965–67. We and UK will also try to find an engine to power India’s homegrown HF–24 fighter, as an alternative to their producing MIG-21s in India.

Bowles is happy; he thinks this package good enough to show the Indians we genuinely want to help, though there’s only a fighting chance they’ll actually bite. Beyond this, he’s made three points back here:

1.
With Nehru on his last legs, this is a time of maximum weakness and indecision in Delhi. The emerging leadership, especially Shastri—the heir apparent, looks good from our viewpoint. Now is the time to encourage them, and to minimize the risk of a swing back toward Menonism.
2.
It’s also no time for the Paks to lean on India over Kashmir. First, this tactic won’t work, because Indians will just crawl into their shells. Second, it diverts Indian eyes from the ChiCom threat and back toward Pakistan as Enemy No. 1, which is just what we don’t want.
3.
The Indians feel we drew back after our first spurt of help to them when the ChiComs attacked. But our new MAP program should help recapture lost ground.

The first draft of the Indian five year defense plan we asked for is, as expected, grossly inflated. But it’s an asking price, not a final one, and Bowles will go back hard to get it trimmed. Even if cut back to what we think reasonable, however, it will entail more foreign exchange outlays than we and UK are willing to cover under military aid. So to pick up some of this business and help our gold flow, we’ll offer reasonable credit terms for some dollar sales.

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Bowles has a scheme for using a large chunk of the over $300 million in surplus rupees we’re holding to set up a bi-national foundation for all sorts of people-to-people programs.2 Since these rupees are valueless to us, we can’t lose. The only real problem is to shepherd this through Congress, on which a friendly word from you may be needed.

Attached is a State background piece.3 I’ll sit in, if you’ve no objection, as the usual precaution against visitors overstating what is said.4

R. W. Komer 5
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64–6/64. Secret.↩
  2. Bowles laid out his proposal for a binational educational and cultural foundation in India in airgram A–864 from New Delhi, March 11. (Ibid., Exchanges with Bowles)↩
  3. Not attached.↩
  4. No record of the meeting between Bowles and Johnson, nor of a previous meeting scheduled for the day before between Rusk and Bowles, has been found.↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩