Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

32. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 31, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Conference between Secretary McNamara and Ambassador Bowles March 31, 1964 at 4:30 pm

1. General Discussion.

Ambassador Bowles discussed the Indian Five Year Defense Plan² and there was agreement that this plan was too large from the point of view of budget, force levels, and number of personnel in the armed forces, and foreign exchange. Ambassador Bowles estimated that the proposed budget would run at about 5.9% of the GNP which was definitely too high.

2. Aircraft Package.

Ambassador Bowles recommended that we offer to the Indians, under our Military Assistance Program something on the order of 70 F6A aircraft for relatively quick delivery and also offer to explore with the Indians the possibility of developing the HF–24. Ambassador Bowles stated that he was sure the Indians would proceed with the HF–24 whether or not we assisted. It was his hope that the foregoing package would be helpful in causing the Indians to reduce or discontinue their proposed MIG production.

3. Conclusions.

Mr. McNamara agreed that we could offer the F6A under our Military Assistance Program to India. He also agreed that we could explore with the Indians the practicality of development of the HF–24, possibly with the Rolls Royce engine. Mr. McNamara also stated that our military assistance for India would have to include substantially more defense production (with the result that we might well have to do the same thing for Pakistan).

Mr. McNamara also agreed to the proposed Chavan visit in May and will send a letter to Chavan via Ambassador Bowles inviting him to Washington.

4. Future Action.

a. Study of the Chinese Air Force. Ambassador Bowles is very anxious to have a detailed study of the Chinese air force as a threat against India. The purpose of this study is to permit Ambassador Bowles to point out the capabilities and weaknesses of the Chinese air threat to India. Ambassador Bowles is leaving for New Delhi on Friday and it is doubtful whether such a study can be prepared by DIA in that time. However, we should collect for Ambassador Bowles a set of presently existing intelligence studies on the Chinese air force. If these studies contain information which Ambassador Bowles should not pass on the Indians we must so indicate to him.

b. Comparison of Aircraft. Mr. McNamara would like to have an analysis prepared which will compare the Chinese aircraft capabilities with the capabilities of the F6A, the F5A, the F–104 A/B, the F–104G, the HF–24 in all versions including estimates on Mark II, and MIG 21. The table should also include similar information for certain aircraft in the Indian air force, namely, the Vampire NF–54, Mystere 4A, Hunter F Mark 56, Gnat F Mark I, Toofani, and Vampire FB–52. On a separate sheet information should be set forth concerning the capabilities of aircraft in the Pakistani air force so that a similar comparison can be made between the threat constituted by the Pakistani air force and the above name aircraft.

c. Development of the HF–24. Arrangements should be made promptly to send U.S. representatives to India to look into the HF–24 development. A thorough investigation should be made as to the fitness of the Rolls Royce engine for the HF–24; the changes which would have to be made in the airframe design to accommodate the Rolls Royce engine; and the changes which would have to be made in the engine manufacturing plant in order to construct the Rolls Royce engine in India. If necessary U.S. representatives should be sent to England to look into the Rolls Royce engine further. If we need to go outside the armed forces and obtain people from industry to review such matters as the aircraft production plant in India, this should be done. The courses of action on this point would appear to be: (i) a cable to the British confirming our interest in this project and our desire to proceed promptly with the above investigation; (ii) the selection of the right people to go to India and possibly the UK and if necessary, Germany to review the availability of the engine with the Germans; (iii) alerting them so that they can carry out their investigation and be back with a report in the U.S. prior to Chavan’s arrival in May; and (iv) obtain from Ambassador Bowles, on his return to New Delhi, assurance that the Indians will cooperate with the U.S. representatives and make all necessary information available to them to prepare their report.

d. The F6A. We should be in touch with Douglas Aircraft Corporation to let them know that we are interested in presenting a package to the Indians which would include the rehabilitated F6A. It would be desirable if material comparable to that given to us at the briefing two weeks ago could be prepared for Ambassador Bowles to take back this coming Friday. In the meantime, we should obtain promptly the refined pricing of the F6A and the related spares and training equipment. This will involve determining from Navy what portion of the spares are surplus stock and what portion of the spares would have to be sold by Douglas to India.

e. Sidewinders. Steps should be taken to obtain the necessary clearance to release to the Indians the F6A and Sidewinder missiles. This may prove somewhat sticky and should be started immediately so that problems can be ironed out as soon as possible and permission obtained.

Peter Solbert

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 333 India. Secret. Prepared by Peter Solbert.
2. A copy of the 110-page Indian Five-Year Defense Plan, covering the years 1964–1969, which was presented to the Embassy in New Delhi on March 21, is ibid., 381 India.