Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

34. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1964, 4:30–5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• General State of MAP for Pakistan and Letter of General Musa

PARTICIPANTS

• Pakistan Side
  • Ambassador to the United States—Gulam Ahmed
  • Military Attaché—Brigadier M. Ismail Khan
  • Second Secretary—T. Y. Mahtab
• United States Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Robert S. McNamara
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Peter Solbert
  • Assistant for South Asian Affairs—Robert J. Murray

The Ambassador opened the meeting by indicating that he would like to discuss the letter of General Musa² and the general state of MAP. The Secretary replied that he found the Musa letter one of the most upsetting he had ever read and indicated that it contained a number of misrepresentations. The Secretary said there was ample room for discussion of future performance but little for past performance.

The Ambassador said that two major problems seemed to be slow induction of equipment and ammunition. Inadequate ammunition reserves and defective ammunition seemed to be causing the Pakistan Army great difficulty. The Secretary said that the ammunition was continuously being delivered and that we had taken steps to correct the defective ammunition. In any case these were the types of things that should be discussed between our respective military people in Pakistan, and the letter indicated to him a complete breakdown of communications on the scene. The Secretary said that if we are at fault we’ll change, but “I don’t think we are.” The Secretary said we could not run the program in this detail from Washington.

Ambassador Ahmed stated that President Ayub would like to know if this was a communications problem or whether the MAP difficulties arose from something else. The Secretary replied that it certainly was a communications problem, not anything else—not our unhappiness at Pakistan’s current relations with the Chinese.

Ambassador Ahmed mentioned that he would like to review a few items in the Musa letter:

1. Parachute Companies. Ambassador Ahmed said the record on this seemed unclear. The Secretary suggested that the record be looked at again: We had promised to increase the battalion from seven to nine companies, five of which were to receive parachute training. This training was now going on. Ambassador Ahmed asked if we could not consider this further and discuss it with General Musa when he is in the United States for the CENTO meetings. The Secretary replied that we could certainly talk about it but that unless new facts had come to light, he did not think the decision would be changed.

2. Hawk Battalions. The Secretary indicated that we had clearly been at fault on this one; we had asked the GOP to organize the necessary battalion personnel and that upon subsequent review of our MAP plans decided that for the limited defense offered and the high cost involved, it was inappropriate to supply one Hawk battalion. It was a question of cost-effectiveness. We should either make a much greater investment than the funds would allow or we should not pro gram any Hawks at all. Ambassador Ahmed asked if that was where the matter now stands, and the Secretary said it was. The Secretary then reviewed the problem of air defense in general, indicating that in Europe they have just decided that a complete air defense was not worth the price. The Secretary noted that the Soviets had spent billions of dollars on their air defense and we can still penetrate them at any time, and that even U.S. air defenses are not 100% effective.

3. Defense Production Assistance. The Secretary noted that we were going ahead with defense production assistance and that we hoped this would resolve some of the outstanding difficulties we have on ammunition to our mutual satisfaction.

4. H–34 Helicopters. Ambassador Ahmed noted the Musa letter mentioned one squadron and asked where this stood at the moment and he was advised that six helicopters of a similar type had already been delivered in accord with the Secretary’s commitment.

5. Modernization of Artillery. Ambassador Ahmed indicated that the slow modernization of our artillery seemed to be causing the armored brigade substantial difficulties. The Secretary stated that self-propelled artillery was being introduced gradually but that we don’t have our own army entirely equipped. We have to modernize on a gradual basis even for ourselves.

Ambassador Ahmed said that “these things struck me as important, and I thought I would bring them to your attention. I hope that General Musa can talk further with you when he arrives later this month. One further point that I thought valid concerned the 5 division force base and the two categories of ‘modernization’ and ‘meeting deficiencies’ being considered separately.” The Secretary replied that while they are separate, they were considered concurrently. “It must be understood that no army can complete its modernization process overnight—we do not do it, the Soviets do not do it, no other country in the world does it, and certainly Pakistan cannot do it.” The Secretary said that he was glad that the Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, was coming as we would have an opportunity to discuss some of these things. They should have been discussed in Pakistan. He reiterated his earlier statement that this was a most upsetting letter, that he thought some of the statements in it were irresponsible, that it erroneously implied that he had failed to meet his commitments and that it certainly indicated a breakdown of communications. Ambassador Ahmed replied that he will want to tell President Ayub, that this was a communications problem and not a problem of another sort. Mr. McNamara asked that he also tell the President that “when I make a commitment, I keep it.” The Secretary also indicated that if this communications problem was not resolved, he would like Ambassador Ahmed to call him at any time to discuss the matter.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0075, Memo of Conversations Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Secret. Prepared by Robert J. Murray on April 22. The meeting was held in McNamara’s office.
2. This letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Pakistan has not been found.