Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

31. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 26, 1964.

Mac—

Phil Talbot’s long cable (London 4705)² strikes me as penetrating in its analysis but feeble in the responses it proposes.

Agreed that our stake in the subcontinent remains “very high.” Agreed that “some Indo-Pak climax is slowly approaching.” Phil’s policy recipe for dealing with the matter is, characteristically, not to get too involved and to continue business as usual (i.e. aid).

There’s much to be said for this recipe. But one major flaw is the assumption that we can stand aloof—if real trouble develops the very fact that our stake is so “high” will tend to drag us in. Most active preventive diplomacy might at least minimize the likelihood of a galloping crisis in which our interests almost inevitably suffer. Cyprus is a case in point. And as in Cyprus, we face a double dilemma on the subcontinent—not only is a risky crisis likely but we are friends with both sides. So we’re forced to carry water on both shoulders, to pursue a middle course, to satisfy neither of our suitors, while the Soviets and Chinese take the easy road of backing one side or the other.

For these reasons I favor a more active effort to turn aside a Kashmir crisis. Phil himself admits we can’t avoid being involved, but his “ploy” of encouraging secret talks will only be accepted if we do a lot of arm-twisting and above all make clear to the “aggressor”—at this point Pakistan—that continued escalation might cost it dearly.

I also see compelling reasons for not returning to “a frank business as usual approach” to Ayub on such a slim basis as Shoaib’s private assurance that the Paks are coming around. We’ll remain trapped on the horns of the Pak/Indian dilemma until we get across to the Paks that they have only a limited partnership with us. We can subsidize their development, protect them against Indian aggression, continue to seek a Kashmir compromise, but we cannot back them in leaning on India.

Moreover, we’ve never had a better opportunity for the necessary readjustment of our Pak relations (to rectify the overcommitment we slid into in 1954–60). Mao’s attack awakened the Indians, while Ayub’s flirtation with the ChiComs has belatedly made all of us realize that Pakistan’s overriding concern is to use us against India. This is wholly understandable, but hardly a mutual US/Pak interest. Moreover, Pakistan’s utter—and irreplaceable—dependence on us means we can, with skill, bring it around to accepting our terms, and still giving us the one thing we really want.

I feel that if we revert to “business as usual” with Ayub now it will simply convince him that he can have his cake and eat it too. It will embolden him more than deter him. Phil argues that the alternative of registering “our unhappiness with Paks by dragging our feet on aid projects and planning … has not worked.” I flatly disagree. In the first place this hasn’t been a consistent policy—we’ve wobbled all over the lot. Only in the last few weeks have we begun to growl (even here we had to get Harriman to say what Talbot didn’t)³ and more important, to show by actions as well as words that we’re unhappy (Kashmir SC postponement, not talking 5 year MAP).

So what’s the risk in waiting at least a few more weeks to see if we’ve registered before starting to talk MAP. I want more to go on than Shoaib’s siren song; I don’t think we’ll “lose this turn in their thinking” by waiting (it may make them turn more). And I doubt that “we can drag feet later” if we’re wrong—it’s been all too difficult to get even the half-baked foot-dragging we’re doing now.⁴

In sum, I urge (1) holding off till we get a few more signals on five-year MAP approach to Paks; (2) developing a scenario for US/UK preventive action to forestall a major Kashmir crisis this year (let’s at least get an option to look at); (3) developing some kind of package to forestall Soviet pre-emption of all aid to the Indian air force (we were hot on this in mid-1962 but no one even heeds Bowles’ pleas today).

With these amendments, I’d buy Talbot policy lines (otherwise excellent) and see in Bowles’ return a real opportunity to get top level focus on them.⁵

RWK

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.
2. Document 30.
3. On March 16 Under Secretary Harriman called in Pakistani Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed to emphasize U.S. concern about Pakistan’s relations with China. Harriman stated that Pakistan’s policy added to China’s prestige and undermined U.S. interests. He added “we find this distasteful.” He expressed the hope that Pakistan would recognize U.S. concerns and would do nothing more to harm U.S. interests. He also admonished Ahmed about the pressure Pakistan was exerting on India on the Kashmir issue, which Harriman stated was counter-productive and undercut U.S. ability to play a constructive role in India. (Telegram 1232 to Karachi, March 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 PAK-US) On March 31 Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed called in Ambassador McConaughy and registered an emphatic objection to the tone and content of Harriman’s remarks to Ambassador Ahmed. (Telegram 1838 from Karachi, March 31; ibid.)
4. McGeorge Bundy made a marginal notation next to this paragraph which reads: “I agree strongly and so does LBJ.”
5. Bundy added another handwritten note at the end of the memorandum which reads: “I agree, except I’m less scared and so less activist on Kashmir; I think Talbot’s tamp-down is fairly good.”