280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State1
Secto 12. Vice President and Secretary met with Prime Minister Nanda for half hour morning January 13.2 Ambassador Bowles and Nehru present, also on Indian side Foreign Secretary C.S. Jha, Secretary to Prime Minister L.K. Jha and Surendra Sinh, and on American side DCM Greene. Following is uncleared memorandum of conversation, [Page 534] much of which dealt with Tashkent meeting and communiqué, and which was supplemented by further half hour with L.K. Jha.
In reply Secretary’s question whether Shastri’s death would affect Tashkent agreement, Nanda said he has tried to make clear that as far as he is concerned Shastri’s word is the word of the nation. Vice President said this encouraging note will be welcomed in Washington. Nanda continued that he felt spirit on both sides is that Tashkent agreement will be fulfilled and that this is a moral commitment. He said India will need the help, wisdom and understanding of all concerned to see it through.
Following brief recapitulation of communiqué, Indians emphasized that its major obligation is that henceforth negotiation not force will be relied on to deal with questions between India and Pakistan.
Foreign Secretary observed that Pakistan High Commissioner is already back in New Delhi and said that Indian High Commissioner would proceed to Karachi on Monday. Following elaboration of chain of events leading to communiqué (see below), Prime Minister noted that Socialists and perhaps others in India will oppose agreement but this is to be expected.
Secretary Rusk called Prime Minister’s attention to President’s State of Union message as reflecting powerful feeling of President’s preoccupation to be able to devote our resources to economic and social development at home and abroad, certainly in India. But U.S. needs peace in the world to be able to do this; hence the most recent diplomatic efforts to find a basis for peace. Secretary noted he had told Gromyko that since 1947 the United States has spent $800 billion on defense, and the Soviets proportionately more; he had said that the Governments of both the United States and Soviet Union owe it to their people to lift this burden.
Nanda said Vietnam struggle is in the way of achieving these goals and eludes solution in the terms suggested. Vice President emphasized U.S. capacity to help people at home and abroad is limited by amount we have to spend on resisting aggression in Southeast Asia. President Johnson has made clear that he wants to get on with development in Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam.
In response to Prime Minister’s general agreement on need to start talking, Vice President agreed and pointed out that U.S. sets no conditions on talks; we want to get disputes out of the area of violence and into the area of reason. When this is done, then we will be able to do the things we want to do for the people in all countries.
Nanda said India also wants peace and equally wants democracy; latter requires defeating poverty and providing food and better life and equal society for all.
[Page 535]Vice President responded that we are committed to same goals and wish people of all Southeast Asia would understand that we would rather use our resources for pursuing these goals than for war.
Nanda noted India had made progress despite problems and tensions confronting it; Vice President agreed and said U.S. supported effort at Tashkent and that he had told Kosygin of President Johnson’s gratification at the outcome of the Tashkent meeting.3 If we could get the same kind of assistance from Kosygin on the Vietnam issue as he had given at Tashkent, it would be helpful. Certainly the U.S. is ready.
L.K. Jha recalled that Shastri’s major impression from talk with Kosygin at Tashkent about Vietnam had been the difference from the hostility and suspicion toward U.S. which he had encountered in May. This time Harriman mission seems to have had a favorable effect, and Kosygin had specifically commented favorably on Harriman having first seen the Poles who had been in touch with Hanoi. Kosygin had also said that the big problem is China.
The conversation with the Prime Minister concluded with his good wishes that the present American efforts for peace would be successful.
Following account of Tashkent meeting emerged from Foreign Secretary’s remarks during meeting with Nanda and L.K. Jha’s subsequent more detailed account.
Talks began well. Ayub in each of personal meetings he had with Shastri, took position that he wanted to live in peace and earnestly implored Shastri to make it possible. Indicated willingness agree to almost anything but said he could not return to Pakistan without something he could show as a gain. On central issue of Kashmir Ayub seemed to be looking for an opening toward a settlement acceptable in Pakistan. Shastri had told him he could not move from well known position. Thereafter Ayub suggested deferring the Kashmir issue and it did not again come up in their conversations; from this Shastri concluded Ayub was prepared not to let Kashmir issue stand in way of restoring good relations between India and Pakistan.
According to L.K. Jha major problem for Shastri was that he could not agree to withdrawal along Kashmir cease-fire line without adequate assurances that infiltration would not recur; accordingly he pressed for either or both of “no war” pact and clear affirmation of respect for cease-fire line. On all other points there seemed to be no substantial controversy.
[Page 536]Next phase, which Foreign Secretary described as “low point”, started with Indians giving Paks draft of a “no war” treaty of friendship. Ayub countered with a one sentence statement to effect both sides agree to seek peaceful solutions of their differences; at Shastri’s suggestion he readily added phrase “without recourse to force.”
Then, on January 8, Indians took hand at draft communiqué calling for respect for cease-fire line and no resort to force. Ayub sent High Commissioner Hussain to Jha with message rejecting both Indian treaty draft and communiqué as entirely unacceptable. This looked like complete breakdown.
Until this point Kosygin had confined his activities to exploring the ground privately and separately with Shastri and Ayub but had made no proposal of his own. After Ayub’s rejection of both formulations, Kosygin asked Shastri whether he should take a hand and Shastri had encouraged him to try as long as it was clear that the effort was entirely Kosygin’s.
Starting at 9:00 in the morning on January 9 and continuing until 12:30 next morning, Kosygin went back and forth, working from his own draft of communiqué, which was close to Indian first draft. Ayub apparently felt he could defend the language that resulted regarding non use of force as a reaffirmation of an obligation already entered into, not as a new obligation. From Indian point of view language was acceptable as reiteration of well known position.
On cease-fire, Paks first tried to confine language to commitment to observe cease-fire along cease-fire line; Shastri said this did not go far enough in covering problem of infiltrators, and result was obligation to observe terms of cease-fire on cease-fire line. Hardest decision of all for Shastri was to accept this as adequate assurance on which to base agreement to withdraw from Haji Pir Pass.
Jha considers that Paks found their anxieties to establish machinery for settling all questions, including Kashmir, met by provision for continuing dialogue. He sensed it was an unspoken assumption on both sides that Kashmir will figure again at a summit meeting after the dust settles. He also believes that when Kosygin sounded Ayub on a Kashmir settlement based on partition along cease-fire line with adjustments, he got a strong negative reaction and dropped the matter. Nevertheless, Shastri continued to feel Paks do not wish resume fighting.
Jha commented that follow through could stumble over several matters, including definitions, e.g. what constitute “internal affairs.” Nevertheless, he was hopeful agreement will be regarded by both sides as charting course for the future, even though both will have some domestic problems. He expressed disappointment that only thing Paks would not agree on explicitly was restoration of property seized during [Page 537] the conflict, but would only agree to talk about it. Indians had felt there could not be a break over this issue.
Vice President and Secretary urged that GOI maintain momentum established by agreement at Tashkent.
L.K. Jha in second meeting also gave further account of Shastri talk with Kosygin about Vietnam. This is being reported in septel.
At conclusion, Jha referred to Shastri’s planned visit to U.S. and said he doubts very much new Prime Minister will be able to leave India on the planned dates. The budget session of Parliament and the budget itself will necessarily occupy his full attention. He went on to make case that India’s economic and particularly foreign exchange difficulties are reaching such a critical stage that further delay in alleviating them could be dangerous. He said he realized that new American commitments to assist in India’s fourth 5-year plan may have to wait, but urged that dangers of further factory closings and unemployment, especially from mid-February onward, be averted by lifting freeze on new U.S. commitments already pledged.
The Secretary said he hoped it would be possible to work this out by consulting together and strongly urged that new Prime Minister not himself freeze on position he could not get to Washington. Secretary said he and Vice President would consult President Johnson. He recalled major political problem, indeed crisis, which had arisen in Congress over further aid to the sub-continent and said that the two countries which received roughly one-third of all U.S. aid have a political constituency in U.S. they have to nourish. He noted the new Prime Minister and President Johnson will have to get in touch to work out the answer to the question Jha had raised.
Meeting concluded with Vice President and Secretary again congratulating GOI on encouraging success at Tashkent, which Vice President noted President Johnson had found very constructive.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok for the Secretary.↩
- The meeting took place during Vice President Humphrey’s and Secretary Rusk’s trip to India for the funeral of Prime Minister Shastri. Also in the party were Senator John Sherman Cooper and former Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith.↩
- A record of the meeting that Humphrey and Rusk had on January 13 with Kosygin was prepared by Rusk and transmitted to Washington in telegram Secto 10, January 13. The meeting was largely devoted to Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY)↩