279. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1
What now on India? South Asia is so important to our larger interests vis-à-vis the USSR, and even more Red China, that I’d like to develop where I think we stand at the moment and where we might go from here.
Though our strategy has been upset by unexpected tragedy, any reappraisal ought to start with recognition that this strategy has worked remarkably well to date. As an early convert (though an initial sceptic), I’ll argue this with anybody. But I’m more impressed with the conversion of the key people in State and AID, along with John Lewis and even Bowles in Delhi. The apparent pulling back which you began last April did force both Paks and Indians to start coming toward us. It also put us in a good position to capitalize on another tragic circumstance, the Pak/Indian war, by making both countries realize that they’d better stop such nonsense if they wanted massive US help. Then yet another circumstance, the approaching Indian famine, gave us even greater leverage.
In Pakistan’s case, the “short-rein” policy of holding up economic and then military aid helped stop Ayub’s drift toward China. It forced Ayub, when faced with the ultimate choice between Washington and Peiping in the final hours of the Pak/Indian war, to reject the Chinese tie lest it mean a break with us. This process culminated in Ayub’s visit, which halted the downward slide in US/Pak relations. Though no aid commitments were asked or given, Ayub made clear that he regarded us as his ally and would not tie up with China, in return for your promise that we would not let India gobble up Pakistan. The game is by no means over, and could be upset if Bhutto got rid of Ayub rather than vice versa, or if the Paks saw in Shastri’s death (as [Page 532] they did in Nehru’s) another chance to gamble on Indian disunity. But the odds are favorable if we resume aid just fast enough to convince the Paks that full resumption is in the cards if they behave, yet do so slowly enough to force Ayub to match it with performance.
In India’s case, our handling of PL 480 (plus the imperative of approaching famine) have produced the opening stgaes of an agricultural revolution. In the last two months India has taken more far-reaching steps toward self-reliance in food than in the preceding 18 years. If India is important, and it is, we must skillfully maintain this momentum by continued use of carrot and stick.
Yet the agricultural revolution is only part of the larger need to revolutionize India’s approach to development—on the sound principle that a democratic, self-sustaining India serves our purposes in Asia (whether formally allied to us or not). There were abundant signs of a likely breakthrough here too, and that Shastri planned to say the right things when he saw you. Our getting off the hook of hinging our whole South Asia policy to the impossible goal of early Kashmir settlement powerfully stimulated this process (and was in effect accepted by Ayub in his talks with you).
Where now? We planned our Pak/Indian strategy around a series of benchmarks, most of them now passed. The September cease-fire was followed by Ayub’s pilgrimage here and now the Tashkent agreements, which will hopefully begin an extended process of Pak/Indian reconciliation. But the culminating visit we envisaged before making the hard decisions on aid resumption has now been cast in doubt by Shastri’s death. The nine months of education we invested in Shastri may have to be repeated with a less pragmatic and more nationalistic successor. Thus Shastri’s death may turn out to be a major setback, though it is too early to tell.
So it is essential to start thinking about how to sustain the momentum of the enterprise. I’d prescribe a combination of generosity toward a nation in travail with continued emphasis on the imperatives of self-help and reconciliation with Pakistan, as most likely to keep the Indians coming toward us. They must do so for food at least—and no interim steps you authorize will really deprive us of much leverage here, since India’s emergency need will grow faster than we can meet it.
The first requirement is to establish sympathetic contact with the new Indian Prime Minister once we know who he is (last time Nehru’s successor was picked in 6 days). So I’d urge renewing the Shastri invite (perhaps for slightly later if it suited Indian convenience). The new Prime Minister might either be unable to come (his first priority must be to establish his own political base) or unable to make commitments if he did. Nonetheless, the gesture would be deeply appreciated.
[Page 533]If Shastri’s successor cannot come soon, then you might consider sending Art Dean (and perhaps myself) quietly to Delhi as well as Karachi around mid-February to get some feel for how firmly the new leadership is prepared to follow the Shastri line. Depending on Dean’s report, we could then decide on what interim steps, e.g. aid resumption, to take pending a later visit by the new Indian prime minister.
In sum, I urge that we not let our Pak/Indian enterprise falter—despite our preoccupation with other pressing matters. South Asia is so important to us—especially at a time of growing confrontation with Red China—that we can’t afford to do so unless there is no other alternative. If the general thrust of this paper makes sense to you, I will draw up (with State) a more detailed scenario.2
I generally approve—go ahead
Let’s wait till the picture clarifies3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2. Secret.↩
- Bundy wrote a marginal notation on the last page of the memorandum that reads: “RWK This memo is an unusually good one. McGB”↩
- Johnson did not respond specifically to either of the options listed by Komer, but he added a handwritten note that reads: “Mc & K—See me as soon as P.M. is selected in India and we will formulate our plans. L”↩