281. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
1795. 1. Vice President, Secretary and Ambassador met January 13 with Subramaniam. Vice President and Ambassador joined meeting after it had started due prior engagement with Kamaraj.2
2. Others present on Indian side were Asoka Mehta, B.K. Nehru, Bhoothalingham, Dias and Surendra Sing; on American side, Senator Cooper, Reuter, Handley and Weiss.
3. Following is summary principal points.
4. In response Secretary’s question, Subramaniam indicated that crop figure still somewhat in question due uncertainty of rains. He hoped to have clearer idea by end of month.
5. Subramaniam stated major new element of uncertainty has entered picture due presumption that as result Shastri’s death scheduled Washington talk with President Johnson was now unsure. GOI had been counting on these discussions to clear up outstanding questions and to provide urgently needed decisions on food and other assistance.
6. Secretary cautioned GOI not to make decision on cancellation Washington talks until President and new PM had opportunity to consult.
7. Subramaniam agreed but expressed doubts would be possible proceed with talks as originally scheduled. He noted new PM will have to organize the government and take hard decisions on budget for upcoming budget session of Parliament. This will take time.
8. He stressed that GOI could not afford additional time for decisions on assistance. Its need for immediate commitments of additional food supplies was most urgent. GOI wished to test to the full, as U.S. had urged, its capacity to unload and distribute food supplies and thus was essential avoid any gap in supply line.
9. He also noted that in anticipation additional supplies would be made available, GOI had chartered 300,000 tons shipping in February over and above existing million and a half tons of grains committed by the U.S. He expected 125,000 tons to be provided by Canadians [Page 539] under their recent commitment, leaving 175,000 tons of shipping yet uncovered by any supply commitments.
10. Subramaniam stressed GOI would need new commitments of PL 480 supplies by beginning February if gap in supply were to be avoided.
11. He and Dias also noted GOI taking risks in running down its stocks on assumption additional supplies would be forthcoming. They emphasized difficulty of planning stock utilization and distribution supplies without some immediate, additional and longer run commitments. They also urged immediate commitments in order take full advantage of most favorable shipping season prior onset of monsoon around next June.
12. Subramaniam also emphasized urgency of additional assistance to provide non-food aid, alluding to unfulfilled 1965 U.S. consortium pledge.
13. Subramaniam noted constructive results achieved at Tashkent in reducing tensions between India and Pakistan and helping bring about rapprochement between them. Alluding to our understandable desire avoid dissipation of U.S. aid in wasteful conflict between the two countries, he believed Tashkent agreement answered one of our major concerns against providing economic aid to India.
14. In view Tashkent and India’s pressing needs which could no longer be postponed, Subramaniam strongly urged U.S. proceed promptly even in absence Presidential-PM talks (a) to release substantial additional PL 480 supplies of food and (b) to make available other U.S. aid already “committed” (that is, U.S. 1965 consortium pledge).
15. After extended discussion, reported below, of steps taken by GOI to mobilize assistance from other countries, Secretary noted that Tashkent and tragedy of Shastri’s death were two new developments which we would have to take into account. He stated that while he could not make any specific commitments at this time, there was general disposition on part of his government to take current Indian crisis seriously and to be helpful. He indicated that when Vice President and he returned to Washington, they would discuss the matter with President and try reach decision on the two requests put forward by Subramaniam.
16. In response query by Vice President and Secretary, Subramaniam summarized major efforts GOI making to obtain assistance from other countries, he presented memorandum3 describing in detail these efforts and results to date. (Handley carrying memorandum.) He also reaffirmed his intention to convene shortly meeting of Ambassadors [Page 540] in Delhi to highlight Indian situation and solicit aid. (Calling of meeting is subject approval interim Prime Minister.)
17. Vice President and Secretary expressed gratification at efforts GOI making and urged GOI keep pressure up. Vice President stated that best we could do to help may not be enough. For this as well as other reasons everyone should pitch in.
18. Vice President particularly stressed approach to Japan. He stated there had been some helpful indications recently of Japanese interest and willingness to assist other countries in Asia. He felt this was thus propitious time to contact Japanese for aid, especially shipping and fertilizer. Vice President also urged Indians to press West Germany for assistance.
19. Vice President and Secretary also urged FAO be prompted to help. Secretary specifically suggested that Sen, Director-General FAO, be approached.
20. Subramaniam had no objection but noted views expressed by U Thant that FAO not proper forum. He repeated what he had previously told Embassy that U Thant had indicated his intention take advantage of January 18 meeting world food program to urge assistance to meet India’s urgent food requirements.
21. Secretary suggested that FAO could at least send note to member governments calling attention to India’s food needs. Subramaniam agreed and said he would try to get this done.
22. In regard to questions about Russian participation, Reuter noted he had informed Dias in earlier conversation that U.S. had no objection to GOI’s approaching Russians for assistance. Secretary agreed, and noted that if Russians could send food to Cuba, why not to India?
23. Vice President and Secretary inquired about reports of great losses food grains due rodents and other wastage and asked what was being done about this. While acknowledging there some wastage, Subramaniam and Dias stated these stories greatly exaggerated. They described some of steps GOI taking to reduce what losses there were, including construction modern storage facilities and campaign to reduce rodent population. Dias noted GOI now has 2.7 million tons of modern storage capacity and has program underway for construction another 2.5 million tons.
24. Vice President and Secretary were pleased to hear of measures being taken. In order to counter alarmist statements and adverse U.S. publicity, they urged GOI get information to the press on true magnitude problem and steps it was taking.
25. Subramaniam and B.K. Nehru noted GOI had gotten such information out but unfortunately it wasn’t as newsworthy as alarmist reports. They agreed make further efforts to make the facts known.
[Page 541]26. Dias noted that in shipments in the last three months some 90 percent of Indian imports of PL 480 wheat was weevil infested. Previously weevil infestation had been around 21–22 percent.
27. Vice President expressed surprise at high rate and indicated U.S. should do something about it.
28. Secretary asked whether there would be any difficulty on part of new Indian Government in continuing present GOI agricultural program and priority to food. Subramaniam replied he anticipated no difficulty. He stressed that program he had announced was Cabinet decision and was made to the Parliament, which would thus expect program to continue. In support of Subramaniam Asoka Mehta noted GOI had already made allocations of funds giving highest priority to agriculture.
29. In response Vice President’s inquiry, Subramaniam indicated GOI had requested for current calendar year 10 million tons of wheat and 1 million milo. Of this amount GOI hoped 4 million could be obtained under Title II and 7 million under Title I.
30. Vice President suggested that when new Prime Minister comes into office, he should make new official request of India’s needs from U.S. Subramaniam agreed to have this done.4
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, Karachi, London, Moscow, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Stockholm, The Hague, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, USUN, and Rome.↩
- Kumaraswamy Kamaraj Nadar, Chief Minister of Madras, 1955–1964, elected President of the Congress Party in January 1964.↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 1796 from New Delhi, January 14, Bowles referred to Subramaniam’s conversation with Humphrey and Rusk and appealed to Rusk, Humphrey, and President Johnson for a decision within the week on a new P.L. 480 agreement to ensure the continuous flow of grain to India. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–8 INDIA)↩