217. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State1
91. Indo-Pak crisis. I saw President alone at his request for 35 minutes beginning 1230 hours today. President showed strain from pressure of issues now bearing down on him. But he was calm, affable and outgoing although distressed. Following covers essence with secondary points to follow in septel.
He reaffirmed his deep conviction U.S. must play decisive role in surmounting present crisis and thereafter. Said Russians have been trying to seize settlement initiative, which should and still can belong [Page 416] to U.S. Thought U.S. actions recently have weighed heavily against Pakistan, although he knew it was not always intended that way. U.S. silence and inaction at various critical moments had also hurt. Chinese Communists expressing sympathetic sentiments in crisis which Paks do not want from ChiComs, and which had been expected from U.S. after events of Sept 6. Pak people bound to be somewhat influenced by contrasting ChiCom and Pak [U.S.?] records last two weeks despite their instinctive aversion for Communists. He said “Hindus” with their usual clever trickery and self-righteousness had given ChiComs opportunity to exploit tragic hostilities—opportunity which would never have arisen if Indians had not opened up international aggression for first time two weeks ago. Indians had again put Paks, rather than themselves, on spot with U.S. He regretted it had not been made clear to all before Sept 6 that international aggression was entirely different and more serious thing from clashes in disputed territory of Kashmir resulting from Kashmiri resistance to Indian oppression. If U.S. had warned early that any crossing of international boundary into territory proper of other by either India or Pakistan would not be tolerated, present dangerous opportunity opened up for Chinese Communists would never been created.
I focused conversation on implications of ChiCom ultimatum and on inescapable and imperative requirement for unconditional cease-fire under UNSC resolutions. I said without arguing background, position at this moment is that ChiComs have it within their power to put Paks in impossible situation unless GOP moves before expiration of ChiCom ultimatum to reject threatened Chinese intervention and implement unconditional cease-fire with India. Anything short of this would put Paks in position of seemingly abetting or at least passively benefiting from ChiCom aggression against India. This would be posture which USG and people could not accept. It would be impossible for Paks or anyone else to prove ChiComs had not been influenced in their decision by Pak failure to disassociate themselves. Such Pak position could not be defended before American Government and people, and I did not know how we could get back on our traditional basis after such a disaster. I asked President if he had been fully informed by Bhutto and Shoaib of my talks with them preceding day (based on Deptel 83 to Rawalpindi).2 President said he had been fully posted and he understood the message.
President said he had just received partial report of UNSC action of last night. I said Sept 22 was shaping up as critical day, both as to acceptance UNSC resolution and as to ChiCom ultimatum. Pak action [Page 417] to disassociate itself from ChiCom designs needed to be taken before that time. I did not see how President Ayub and his govt could live down a failure to take this action. Even a semblance of Pak association with ChiComs in exertion of Communists military pressures on any free country would put Pakistan beyond reach of U.S. help.
President said with deep feeling that there was no Pak collusion or even consultation with ChiComs. There was no understanding between them and he had no knowledge of ChiCom intentions. All he knew of their moves was what he read in the world press. President then informed me that he had “recently” sent a message to Peiping telling ChiComs, “For God’s sake, do not come in. Do not aggravate the situation.”
I told him this information was significant, and I wanted to cite it in my report of the conversation. I asked him if he could expressly assure me that we had quite recently transmitted such a message to the Chinese Communists, and did he authorize me to quote him directly to this effect? President replied, “Yes, I do, except leave out ‘for God’s sake’.”
I said way seemed open for President to follow through in the sense of his message to ChiComs and I urged him to do forthwith. He answered that he would give the most earnest thought to cease-fire decision to take effect next day or so. Great obstacle was Pak public opinion. He asked, “How can I survive an action which will look to the people as if we are giving up on Kashmir, just to help the Indians, with justice for the Kashmiris within our grasp?” “After all the sacrifices that have been made, how can I explain a decision to throw it all away with nothing but another UN resolution to show them?” He expressed grave concern that he and his government could not stand in the face of the expected violent public reaction. “The people would not understand.” I told the President that if I knew anything about the people of Pakistan—their ideals, beliefs and convictions—after 3 1/2years here, I knew that they understood the inherent evil of Communism and its antipathy to every principle of Islam. I believed that even the rank and file Pakistani people without educational opportunities had learned from their mullahs that nothing good could come out of Communism. I believed the people would understand and reject the evil Communist motivation, which aimed at eventual disaster for Pakistan and Kashmir, as much as for India. I believed he could carry the people with him in a decision for national integrity and peace, and for the well being and continued development progress of the people of Pakistan in association with her true friends.
President said he agrees with my estimate of the inherent distrust of Communism on the part of the people and their understanding of its complete incompatibility with Islam. Still the people considered China to be less of a threat to Pakistan than were India and the USSR. He could [Page 418] not be sure that he could survive what would seem almost universally to be a decision to sacrifice the first national objective for the apparent purpose of helping an India which had not righted its wrongs.
I said the reality was far different and the people could be brought to sense this. I expressed a profound conviction that with his unrivaled place in the hearts and the confidence of the people of the country, he could carry them with him. I assured the President that the U.S. would do everything at its command to support him in any difficulties which might grow out of an affirmative decision by him on the UNSC cease-fire call and on the repudiation of ChiCom intervention. I told him that if it had ever seemed that the Kashmir settlement question was treated with a measure of resignation by the friends of Pakistan and India, it could never be so treated again after the fires through which we were now passing. President Ayub could count on a new sense of urgency in the international approach to this issue, if the GOP played its part in this hour.
In bidding me an affecting good-bye, President put his hand on my shoulder and said “God bless you,” words which I repeated to him.3
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi, USUN, London, New Delhi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Tehran, Ankara, the White House, DOD, and CIA. Also passed to USIA.↩
- Document 214.↩
- In the assessment of this conversation, sent to the Department in telegram 94 from Rawalpindi, September 20, McConaughy expressed concern that although Ayub seemed to be leaning in the direction of accepting a cease-fire “in a Hamlet mood he might find himself unable to make the decision.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)↩