Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Pakistan¹

Washington, September 21, 1965, 12:19 a.m.

92. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. You should seek an urgent appointment with Ayub on the grounds that you have reported your last conversation and have received further instructions.

2. You should say to Ayub that his assurances with respect to his personal attitude toward Chinese Communist intervention have been received with great satisfaction in Washington. Unfortunately, the international political requirements cannot be met only by a private assurance alone. The U.S. public and world opinion too will inevitably assume Pak/Chicom collusion if the Chicoms move at a time when the Paks have not accepted the Security Council cease-fire demand.

3. The Security Council resolution is the product of intensive efforts by the U.S. delegate in which Indian and Soviet pressures were resisted sufficiently so that Kashmir is specifically mentioned in the preamble and SC consideration of how to reach a settlement is foreshadowed in operating Paragraph 4.² These two important changes are seen among best friends of Pakistan in Washington as providing the necessary footing for the Pak decision to accept the resolution. We regard Pak acceptance of this resolution as absolutely fundamental to restoration of peace in the area and do not see how Paks can get more until hostilities stopped.

4. The US supports every part of this resolution; so the GOP can be certain that, if the cease-fire is accepted, the US will not neglect its responsibilities under operative Paragraph 4. Indeed the US will expect to conduct its relations with the two parties with a careful eye to their own readiness to move forward with the efforts foreshadowed in that Article. However, you should avoid giving any impression that we are committing ourselves to support any particular form of negotiated settlement, or that we will cut off the Indians if they do not accept one. If necessary, you should make this very clear. What we are talking about is the readiness of the US to sustain the position that settlement of the underlying problem is needed, and that both parties should address themselves to that problem in good faith.

5. Without engaging the President directly, you should make it very clear that men closest to him here are convinced that Pak acceptance of SC resolution will clear the way for early man-to-man discussion between Ayub and President Johnson which could have most constructive effect on Pak/US relations. In fact, should President Ayub choose to couple visit to Washington with personal appearance at UN, we would warmly welcome this.

6. We do not fully understand significance of Bhutto visit to UN, but if Ayub should speak of Bhutto’s mission in terms suggesting a last minute effort to change sentiment in the Security Council, you should leave him in no doubt that Bhutto is on a fool’s errand. Ayub is his own best counsellor at this moment of decision.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Top Secret; Exdis; Flash. Drafted in the White House on September 20, and cleared by Ball, Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary David H. Popper (IO), Komer, and McGeorge Bundy. Approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.
2. Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 211 of September 20 indicated that as soon as a cease-fire agreement was in effect the Council would consider the steps that could be taken to assist toward a settlement of the political problem underlying the conflict. (UN doc. S/RES/211)