211. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
698. L.K. Jha reports that Chinese movements in battalion strength on Eastern border of Ladakh and in Chumbi Valley indicate that Peking is getting ready for military action. GOI therefore asks if we would be [Page 406] willing on strictly covert basis to authorize US personnel to consult with Indian military planners on contingency basis.
Jha stressed that this action need not imply favorable US response to India’s request for help if Chinese attack. However, if an attack should come it could speed up effective assistance by several days.
We have personnel here who are qualified to open such discussions. I recommend that we be authorized to proceed with strict understanding that no US commitment is involved.2
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1 INDIA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to USUN, DOD, Karachi, London, Hong Kong, CINCMEAFSA, and the White House and passed to DOD, CIA, and USIA.↩
- The Department responded that the United States was not prepared to initiate contingency planning. A decision taken at the “highest level” was to avoid commitment of any sort pending the unfolding of the situation. In discussions with the Indian Government, the Embassy was instructed to indicate that the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was heavy and increasing. Effective defense of the subcontinent, from the U.S. perspective, depended on the internal strength of India and Pakistan, and the conflict between the two countries undermined that strength. It was essential that India move toward a rational solution to the problems, including Kashmir, that divided and weakened the subcontinent so that it could face the major threat from China. (Telegram 513 to New Delhi, September 18; ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK)↩