Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

201. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, September 11, 1965.

576. In response to what he described as urgent request I called on Pres Radhakrishnan Saturday afternoon at 5. He said he had great deal on his mind and covered wide variety of subjects. Following are highlights:

1. At session with U Thant tomorrow India is prepared to say at outset that it fully accepts Security Council resolution to pull back its troops all along line providing Pakistan pulls back theirs including infiltrators they have introduced into Kashmir. Since infiltrators have been returning in large numbers to Azad Kashmir during last few days latter question seemed more manageable than it might have been week ago.

President added that there might be some continuing negotiations in regard to few sections of Azad Kashmir including Kargil and Haji Pir Pass which controls strategic transportation routes into Kashmir Valley, or within Valley. However he did not think this needed to be sticking point.

Solution might lie in adjustments along ceasefire line where India could compensate Pakistan for strategic areas they have in mind. Or if this were not acceptable to Pakistan he thought India would agree to accept guarantee of more adequate controls by UN.

President added that U Thant was staying with him, and that he looked forward to some good talks.

In response I stated that we welcomed willingness of Indians to accept Security Council resolution, and I understood India’s conviction that military question be detached at this stage from Kashmir political problem. However I wondered if India could not offer Pakistan some concession in political field such as proposal for two year cooling off period during which each country would seek to improve atmosphere on subcontinent through cultural exchanges, elimination of propaganda and radio attacks, etc. At end of this cooling off period it could be agreed that outstanding economic and political questions would be discussed by series of committees and commissions.

Radhakrishnan replied that he personally could see no objection to this suggestion although he did not think that it was possible to agree to the Kashmir adjustments that Pakistan has in mind. Best solution would be changes in present ceasefire line, but even this could not be tackled in present heated atmosphere; no Indian govt could survive that agreed to give up any Kashmir soil under these conditions.

2. Against background of Swaran Singh’s statement last night that India was trying to keep fighting at minimum during U Thant visit, I asked about reports seeping into Delhi of heavy casualties and losses on both sides. Radhakrishnan stated that Swaran Singh was correct in that India was not attempting to advance but rather was fighting from strong defensive positions. Paks had attacked persistently with heavy commitment of their armored strength and except for one small area had been repulsed. He added that morale in Pak army seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. Twelve Patton tanks had been captured today when their crews deserted; two others had surrendered.

I asked the President if any casualty figures were available and he said confidentially that Indians had lost 8,000 killed. When I expressed surprise at this high figure, he said the Pak losses had been significantly heavier. When I pressed to get count of prisoners, wounded, etc., he retreated from his original estimate, saying that he might have been wrong. (Note: This is much higher than any other figure we have had thus far.)

3. President stated he was worried about what seemed to him clearly provocative action Pak Air Force was now taking in East Pakistan. It was to India’s obvious interest to neutralize East Pakistan and confine fighting to western front. However hotheads in Pak Air Force were doing their best to stir up Indian military on grounds that major fighting in East Pakistan would help to bring Chinese into war.

I made strong plea for India to exercise moderation, pointing out that most important thing right now is to be sure politicians control military and that India is not led into blunders by military men who were oblivious to political realities.

At this point Radhakrishnan rang bell by his chair and when one of his military aides entered room, he said, “Please ask the Air Marshal (meaning Arjan Singh) to call on me at 6 pm.” I remarked that President seemed to be exercising his prerogatives as CIC. President replied that although he was not directly involved in military questions he was in position to play moderating role and he knew that Arjan Singh would listen to him.

4. Conversation turned to question of China. Radhakrishnan said Indian Govt is deeply worried about possibility of Chinese attack, particularly because language of recent Chinese note was reminiscent of threats India had received in early fall of 1962. If attack should come, what could India expect from US?

I responded that our actions would no doubt depend on conditions existing at that time. In view of our long efforts to contain ComChina over last twenty years we obviously had no desire to see them overrun Assam or any part of India. At same time we had no desire to underwrite total war on subcontinent. Therefore much would depend on genuineness of India’s efforts to reach agreement with Pakistan so that bulk of her resources could be used against China. I stressed that I could not speak for President, that I was only giving him my offhand personal view. Radhakrishnan stated that he fully understood and thought that my analysis was fair.

5. President stated India was also worried about Indonesia, Turkey and Iran. In case of Indonesia Indians had made official request to Soviet Union to cut off spare parts, ammunition and other supplies as we had done in case of India and Pakistan. So far GOI had not received reply.

In regard to Turkey and Iran, India hoped that we would not permit shipment of arms obtained under CENTO.² He understood that Iran was also intending to supply Pakistan with petroleum products.

He then repeated Swaran Singh’s request of last evening that we publicly urge all nations not to send equipment to either Pakistan or India on grounds that by supplying belligerents war would be more likely to spread.

6. Pres Radhakrishnan then brought up submarine which we have loaned to Pakistan. What could we do to stop Paks from using our submarine to blow up Indian shipping?

I explained that we were in dilemma because Pakistan could just as easily argue that we should withdraw radar equipment which we had previously loaned to Indians. Under circumstances we thought best thing to do was to steer clear of whole subject since we are unable to enforce original agreements with either govt.

7. President asked whether I thought Paks could be persuaded to accept Security Council resolution as India intended to do. I replied that from all indications Paks intended to push hard for Kashmir political agreement as condition for ceasefire.

Radhakrishnan said GOI had unverified reports that Ayub Khan was being pushed out or at least into background and that Bhutto and Musa might seize power with purpose of continuing war to bitter end. He earnestly hoped that this rumor was false.

Comment: I gather that President’s general purpose was to inform me that India was prepared to accept U Thant’s proposals and he was hoping that I might have something to tell him about intentions Pakistan.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Karachi, London, and the White House. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 2:55 p.m.
2. Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary Rusk on September 11 with an urgent request for a U.S. public statement opposing outside intervention in the conflict. Nehru cited reports that Turkey and Iran might supply Pakistan with military equipment obtained from the United States. (Telegram 429 to New Delhi, September 11; ibid.)