202. Editorial Note
On September 12, 1965, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara again discussed developments on the subcontinent during a telephone conversation.
Johnson: “What do you think about the India-Pakistan thing?”
McNamara: “I’m pleased that it hasn’t erupted to a higher level of military action than it has. I really don’t know how it’s getting along. Our intelligence is—I don’t mean CIA necessarily—I mean information we get through our military sources and diplomatic. That’s really not very good. I don’t know exactly how the battle is going. What little information I do have on it indicates to me that the Paks are ahead at this point.”
Johnson: “Yes, that’s the way it appears.”
McNamara: “And my own impression of the relative military strengths of the two countries is that the Paks could continue to achieve military advantage for a period of, I’d just guess off-hand 4 weeks. [Page 392] And then at the end of that period I would think that the total strength of the Indians in terms of men and equipment, which is roughly four times that of the Paks, would begin to be felt. And then by the end of say 12 weeks, if the conflict continues that long, I would expect the Indians to reverse the trend and then be in a militarily advantageous position.”
Johnson: “What about the Chinese? That’s the 64 dollar … .”
McNamara: “We don’t have any real evidence, and I think we would have if there had been substantial moves. We don’t have any real evidence that they’re building up strength on that Northeast Frontier Agency border. And we’ve been very anxious to get more intelligence, we’ve worked out a plan to do it with some U–2s. I think this will give us advance notice of any movement of men or equipment up there. And there has to be some movement before they can effectively intervene. They can intervene with a few advance days of preparation on their part, and I think they would just clean up that area—push the Indians out if they chose to do so. I rather doubt they’ll choose to do it. It’s very dangerous for them to do so. My own view is that it almost certainly would involve Western support to India, which China would like to avoid. The great danger here, it seems to me, is the weakening, if not destruction of the Indian political institutions as a result of this.”
Johnson and McNamara then briefly discussed the threat to Indian political institutions.
Johnson: “What about our continuing to send in economic help, food to both of them while they’re fighting?”
McNamara: “I’d put it off a little while, Mr. President. I think you’re going to have to send the food a week from now, or two weeks from now, but you don’t have to do it today. I just don’t see how you can avoid sending food to really starving people.”
Johnson: “Well, you know damn well as Napoleon says, an army runs on its belly. And you know that they’re going to go right to the army.”
McNamara: “No. No, I don’t think so. The food’s going to the army anyhow. There’s not going to be any food shortage in the army, whether you send food or not. But on the food, as I said, you don’t have to decide today. You probably don’t even have to decide it a week from today.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, September 12, 1965, 9:26 a.m., Tape F65.02, Side B, PNO 1)