Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

200. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, September 10, 1965, 1005Z.

52. Deptel 312 to Karachi.² Suspension military aid shipments to Pakistan and India.

I saw FornMin Bhutto in Rawalpindi 5:30 p.m. Sept 9 to deliver text Mahon Congressional statement (Deptel 310 to Karachi).³ Transmittal this report on meeting delayed by difficulties of night work and movement owing to blackout and curfew with added handicaps incident to removal of 500-lb. Indian dud bomb from environs Embassy residence last night.

Bhutto read full text which I delivered to him and listened attentively to my exposition of what the action did and did not signify.⁴ After long pause he described our action in tone of foreboding as a fateful one which adhered to, would mean that Pak-U.S. relations could not be the same again. He termed the decision an act not of an ally and not even that of a neutral. Rather, it was an act which would be of net benefit to the Indian side. He argued that India with its varied sources of foreign supply, its larger domestic armaments industry and its greater industrial capacity and reserves could stand the loss of U.S. supply flow far better than could Pakistan, which had placed all of its reliance on the U.S. and was almost totally dependent on this one source. Attrition was already becoming a problem for the Pak forces and attrition would soon have a ruinous effect on Pakistan’s ability to defend itself if U.S. decision not reversed. Said Paks would fight on to finish with sticks and stones and with bare hands if necessary, but their ability to hold back Indian attack would be vitally undermined by this U.S. blow. He asked to convey the earnest plea of the GOP for reconsideration.

Bhutto said that if U.S. intent by this action was to put pressure on Pakistan to compel it to accept UNSYG’s proposals, we would be disappointed, for pressure effort would have exact oppsite effect. GOP would now be even less inclined than before to accept proposals which would not contain assured provision for withdrawal of Indian armed forces from Kashmir and exercise of self-determination right by Kashmiris. Pakistan would not respond to the kind of pressure inherent in the U.S. action.

Bhutto gave an impassioned account of history of Kashmir troubles with India over last four months beginning with May 15 Indian occupation of posts on Pak territory near Kargil and ending with outright Indian invasion of territory of Pakistan proper across international border on Sept 6, which had introduced an entirely new dimension into the conflict. This was a deliberate act of aggressive war which had to be treated apart from the Kashmir fighting. Pakistan stood at a historic crossroads and was fighting for its very existence against a total Indian challenge. It was crucial for allies and friends of Pakistan, among which the U.S. came first, to understand this and to respond. Pakistan could not fathom U.S. refusal to see the case of her ally in the hour of that ally’s trial and victimization by Indian aggressor, an aggressor that had never had any regard for the U.S. and had never assumed any commitments to or done anything for the U.S. He pled with us to stop the Indian aggression by cutting off economic assistance to India, including PL–480 food, until India terminated the aggression against Pakistan. Argued that action just announced by U.S. would be of only minor consequence to Indians, but a disastrous reverse to Pakistan. It would reward the aggressor and brand the U.S. as unwilling even to follow a neutral course toward a beleaguered ally. No one could deny that Pakistan had been attacked on her own undisputed territory on Sept 6 and was engaged in a fight for her national existence. Was this not an exercise of legitimate self-defense?

Bhutto bitterly recounted Indian cruelties and repressions against Kashmiris on both sides of CFL, stating that Shastri govt far more vicious than Nehru govt in exterminating and deporting Muslims, facilitating influx of Hindu migrants, trying to rub out distinctive indigenous character Kashmir state and people, and re-introducing worst aspects of old Dogra regime.

I sought to stem Bhutto tirade by pointing out that we were convinced that action was for preservation of Pakistan as well as subcontinent as a whole; that unconditional acceptance now by Pakistan of Security Council’s and SYG’s proposals would in any event protect Pakistan from victimization by superior military power of India; that our action was not punitive or threatening, but an unwillingness (demanded by U.S. public opinion and feelings of humanitarianism) to fuel a destructive conflict totally irreconcilable with the principles of peaceful negotiation and settlement which we believed were the only ones which would work. I told Bhutto it seemed to us that GOP was refusing to abandon the resort to force unless it attained in advance full agreement to its basic objectives as to Kashmir. It was not sensible to assume that this most intractable of world issues that has defied all solution efforts for 18 years could be settled now by the attachment of a Pakistani-prescribed rider to a cease-fire agreement. It would not be politically conceivable for any Indian government to concede the whole basic issue in relation to cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire and withdrawal by both sides would have to come first and Pakistan would need to take it on faith that a most resolute and concentrated multilateral effort to achieve a negotiated peaceful settlement would be mounted immediately thereafter.

Bhutto said with conviction that it would not be possible to ask the brave Pakistani soldiers or the Kashmir freedom fighters who had sacrificed so much to accept a capitulation by the GOP to the old status quo which would certainly mean a repetition of the intolerable delays, defiances, and deceptions of the Indians over the last 18 years, with even greater ruthlessness and intransigence to be expected from the Indians after their success. The Indians were demanding cease-fire terms which would fully consolidate their strangle hold on Kashmir. Pakistan could never accede to such terms, or accept a formula which would render meaningless all the sacrifices of those patriots standing fast against India oppression. I said the GOP must be aware of the fact that our decision not to fuel the conflagration on either side was not only the decision of the Executive branch but of the Legislative branch and the U.S. people as well, a decision which the GOP should not expect to be changed in present situation. If unhappy contingency arose where India would be in position of defying UN after Pakistan accepted SC and UNSYG proposals, an entirely new situation would be created which would have to be examined on its merits.

Bhutto put in a plea for permission for Pakistan to buy for cash the necessary military supplies from the U.S. to keep its defense machine going, if the U.S. adhered to its position that it could not continue the flow on the usual grant basis. He said the Pakistanis would sell all their possessions, even their family heirlooms in order to get the means to continue the struggle until the Indian invasion repulsed and Kashmiri rights established. Pakistan would somehow obtain the necessary means of continuing the struggle by one means or another.

I told him he knew the matter with us was not one of dollars and cents in this hour of trial but of doing the best we could to stop the holocaust and start the search for a peaceful settlement which could endure.

The difficult meeting ended on a somber note with an oppressive feeling on my part that more ominous developments may be in the air.⁵

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Karachi, London, New Delhi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, and CIA.
2. See footnote 2, Document 194.
3. See footnote 3, Document 190.
4. On September 10 the Department also sent notice to Karachi and New Delhi that effective September 10 no further commercial licenses for the export of munitions to India and Pakistan were to be issued. In addition, all shipments of munitions to the two countries for which valid licenses had been issued but which had not left the United States were stopped. (Telegram 350 to Karachi, also sent as telegram 427 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)
5. McConaughy sent a more detailed account of the conversation to the Department on September 11 in telegram 444. (Ibid.)