199. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1
Pak/Indian Roundup. Still no clear picture of the situation on the only really active front in the Punjab below Kashmir. Pak counter-attacks in the Lahore area have taken them well into India, and Delhi seems quite worried.
The SYG doesn’t seem to have gotten very far in his talks with the Paks, who are still insisting on a Kashmir settlement as part of any cease-fire agreement. Nor does McConaughy’s latest talk with Bhutto (Karachi 4282 attached) show much give.
The much more guarded tone of Indian statements suggests that Delhi is getting worried over Pak counterattacks. Chavan’s denial India was attacking East Pakistan is the first bright move they’ve made so far. But Delhi’s 5643 from an excellent source shows little give as yet either.
The consensus here is that neither side will begin to negotiate seriously until more blood has been let. Many of us feel that the Paks will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector. But this would only humiliate the Indians and probably make them less likely to stop shooting. The Paks are already beginning to worry about running out of ammo, etc. at which time Indian weight would begin to tell.
[Page 384]Our Muslim friends (Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia especially) are eager to show their sympathy to the Paks.4 We don’t think we ought to growl at them too much because they won’t provide significant support and it helps for the Paks to think they have at least a few anchors left to Westward.
PM Wilson told the Paks he saw a solution emerging in four stages: (a) cease fire; (b) return to status quo; (c) neutralize and quiet Kashmir; and (d) a Kashmir settlement. U Thant too says the UN would probably have to take on the Kashmir issue again. The Brits apparently envisage some Commonwealth initiative if U Thant fails, and are probing Moscow’s view.
Nothing from the Chicoms so far except more noise. But Delhi fears the Paks may try to incite India to attack East Pakistan, because this would trigger the Chicoms.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IV, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/65–9/65. Secret.↩
- Document 198.↩
- In telegram 564 from New Delhi, September 10, the Embassy reported on a conversation with Sarvepalli Gopal, Director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and son of President Radhakrishnan. According to Gopal, India had no territorial ambitions in Pakistan, but had established the objective in the war of destroying the Pakistani military capability, thereby also finally settling the Kashmir issue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)↩
- The Embassy in Tehran reported on September 9 that the Shah had received a telephone call from Ayub with an urgent request for help. Ayub reportedly said that the ally capable of providing the most effective assistance was the United States, which was failing to respond probably because of a desire to see Pakistan destroyed and one Indian nation emerge on the subcontinent. (Telegram 313 from Tehran; ibid.) On September 10 Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué, which fixed responsibility for the war on the subcontinent on India, and expressed their readiness to support Pakistan. They also endorsed the appeal of the UN Secretary-General for a cease-fire, and indicated that they were prepared to put contingents of their armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations as peacekeeping forces. (Telegram 274 from Ankara, September 10; ibid.)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩