172. Editorial Note
On August 19, 1965, Ambassador Chester Bowles sent a 10-page memorandum to President Johnson entitled “Observations on Military Aid to the Indian Subcontinent.” He sent it under cover of a letter in which he described the issue of military assistance as “one of the most complex and difficult on our Asian agenda.” Bowles devoted part of his memorandum to tracing the history of what he saw as an opportunity wasted in the wake of the 1962 border war between India and China to establish the United States as the principal source of military assistance to India. The failure to do so, Bowles pointed out, had opened the door to increasing Soviet military assistance and influence in India. [Page 339] Bowles painted a picture of India evolving into an Asian Yugoslavia, but he argued that it was not too late to reverse the trend. He proposed that the United States should continue the 5-year $50 million grant and $50 million sales assistance support program for India, while at the same time opening the way for India’s procurement of the weapons it needed for its defense, including F–5 fighters. He recognized that such a program would prompt an adverse reaction from Pakistan, but he argued that the United States should face up to the Pakistani reaction and cushion it with the economic assistance upon which Pakistan was dependent. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles)
On August 28 President Johnson sent a note to McGeorge Bundy and Bromley Smith which reads: “I have read Chester Bowles’ memo and I would like the best analysis I can get. In my judgment we ought to get out of military aid to both Pakistan and India. I want to see Rusk about it.” (Ibid.)