Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, August 19, 1965, 7:56 p.m.

278. For Ambassador Goldberg. President desires that you go back at Amjad Ali to reinforce idea that Ayub visit here highly desirable, since new situation created by violent Pak attacks on US makes highest level meeting of minds almost essential if Pak/US relations to be unfrozen.

Suggest you tell Amjad you have checked with Washington and found President greatly appreciative Ayub’s friendly sentiments and assurances our ties still strong, but frankly found them hard to square with public stance taken by Paks, including Ayub himself.

Even so, the President clearly reciprocates Ayub’s “warm personal friendship” and believes that the two of them could quickly reach an understanding. So he welcomes the idea of highest level dialogue in Washington. You raised the question of someone like yourself going out to pave the way—but it’s clear that you or George Woods or a high-powered Pak envoy couldn’t settle matters. Only the two Presidents could. That’s why an early direct meeting of minds at the top seems the best way to put Pak/US relations back on the tracks. The President regards Ayub as having a cordial standing invite for early fall, but you assume he’d be quite prepared to reinvite Ayub if the latter were receptive. As Secretary Ball told Bhutto in London, we had hoped the visit could be rescheduled for September.

Therefore, your own personal instinct is to urge that the two Presidents get together soonest. In fact, your hunch is that it’s hard to see how Pak/US relations can be unfrozen in the way the Paks want otherwise. FYI, though we are most unlikely to make a pledge until Ayub comes, we do not want to give any direct ultimatum to the Paks, lest it freeze their position. End FYI.²

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Komer, cleared by Talbot and Michael V. Connors in IO, and approved by Mann. Repeated to Karachi.
2. Goldberg passed the message to Amjad Ali as instructed on August 20. Ali expressed appreciation for the cordial remarks and the renewed invitation, but he pointed out that it might be difficult for Ayub to leave Pakistan because of the tense situation developing over Kashmir. (Telegram 453 from USUN, August 20; ibid.)