173. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Washington, August 20, 1965.
Mac—
Other mood music on Pak problem is as follows:
- 1.
- Mann is opposed to looking nervous by too much frantic diplomacy to get Ayub here shortly. He fears that we’ll cave at the last minute on pledging so doesn’t want to see us get out on too much of a limb till we’ve looked all the way down the road. He wants to be sure the President is really prepared to see 23 September go by without a pledge, even at the cost of considerably increased risk to Peshawar (about which the whole intelligence lobby will scream). He thinks we must make a deliberate choice as to whether we’re willing to lose it, if necessary. Tom says he’s seen too many cases in which we got chicken at the last minute.
- 2.
- Talbot and the experts (powerfully abetted by Pickard) are leading the chickens, with an assist from Ball. They are genuinely fearful [Page 340] that we can push the psychotic Paks too far, with the result that: (a) a major crisis could be precipitated in the subcontinent, maybe even a rash Pak attack on India; and/or (b) the Paks could tell us to go jump, and take Peshawar with us. The Paks are playing with fire by their continued major infiltration into Kashmir; if the Indians decide to strike back elsewhere or Hindu-Moslem riots occur, we’ll have a big mess. I think they overstate the risks, but am the first to admit that the stakes are big. Perhaps we should give the President a reminder as to the risks, however.
- 3.
- The experts also argue against softening up Ayub with counter-threats. A soft sell is better calculated to get him here, as well as some US gesture which will help him to save face (e.g. sending someone out or inviting Bhutto here).
- 4.
- In any case they also see the odds as strongly against Ayub coming here before 23 September. He won’t come to Canossa on such short notice. Talbot says that to come just before 23 September would make Ayub seem to be negotiating under the gun. But he and Pickard see the odds as good that we could get Ayub to come later (earliest would be October), if we’re careful not to crowd him too much.
- 5.
- No one has an answer to what we’d then do on 23 September. Mann says just “sweet talk” but no aid or at best a partial pledge. I’d agree. So just in case, we’re now actively looking at ways to slide past 23 September with a minimum of fireworks.
RWK
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.↩