Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

170. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 19, 1965, 5 p.m.

Pak/Indian Roundup. Karachi 255² at Tab A is a fascinating talk between Bhutto and McConaughy, which makes clear that the Pak tactic is to wait us out until they see if we make a consortium pledge. Then Ayub might be willing to come (perhaps before he goes to the UK in mid-October). Bhutto is clearly angling for a prior visit, and Rusk at least will have to see him because he’s coming to the UNGA. Bhutto clearly has the wind up that we think him the enemy, so we’ll have to treat him with kid gloves. We might even be able to softsoap him into being the conciliator.

Goldberg-Amjad Ali. At Tab B is Goldberg’s report on the reply he got,³ which he says he discussed with you. We’ve asked him to go back at Amjad, stressing that only the two Presidents can make the real decisions needed, so an early summit is far better than special envoys.⁴

The UK Approach. We’ve finally given the British a brief,⁵ which makes clear to them at least our feeling that if Ayub can’t come we can’t pledge. They say they’ll do their best, but their experts and ours agree that Ayub will regard coming so close to 23 September as negotiating under the gun. So they doubt we can possibly get Ayub here before October. Bundy and I keep saying “try!”

Shastri Visit. Tom Mann and I have stressed to B.K. Nehru the desirability of Shastri coming here in October. Bowles also took up the matter with Shastri’s chief aide again. My hunch is Shastri will come; if so, it’s imperative this not leak till we’ve told Ayub.

Kashmir crisis. This mess may yet get much worse, which could change the whole bidding on visits. The Pak infiltration effort to stir up a local revolt seems to have failed so far, but the Paks are still at it and the Indians are retaliating.

R. W. Komer ⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.
2. Dated August 18; attached but not printed.
3. Reference is to telegram 399 from USUN, Document 169.
4. Johnson added a handwritten note at the end of the memorandum which reads: “We will await Cong action before commitments. Then we will await their visit before participating in consortium. Goldberg goes too far in assuming as soon as Cong acts all is well. We will determine what is in our natl interest & act accordingly after Ayub visit. Get this word to him loud, clear, & unequivocal. L.”
5. A paper entitled “Guidelines for British Talks With President Ayub” was given to Cyril Pickard of the Commonwealth Relations Office on August 19 at the conclusion of his visit to Washington for talks on the Pakistan consortium problem. The text of the paper was transmitted to Karachi in telegram 220, August 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK)
6. McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature.