162. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Rusk1
The President wanted me to pass on the points I made to him over the weekend on Pakistan. I was pointing out the problems inherent in the apparent Pak decision to wait us out on our consortium, meanwhile mobilizing counterpressures on us.
The risk in sitting tight under these circumstances was that if the Paks didn’t get the word, and start coming to us, we’d face a tough decision on 23 September. If we then made the pledge they wanted, it would look as though we’d capitulated to Pak pressures. If we didn’t make a pledge, it would trigger a far worse crisis with the Paks. Since we’d no longer be able to use the Congressional argument, it would appear as a straight political pressure play. The Paks might then feel compelled to put the squeeze on Peshawar, for example.
So I suggested stepping up our effort to make Ayub come to us before 23 September by a series of steps designed to shake him loose. These wouldn’t involve chasing after him but rather making quite clear that he was skating on thin ice: (1) Pass the word via direct and indirect means that by making such a public to-do over our request for consortium postponement, he’d changed the name of the game. Therefore, unless the Paks changed their tune we might not be able to make any pledge at all. (2) Shaking Pak confidence that they had an ace up their sleeve in Peshawar by suspending all new construction (thus making them think we might pull out). (3) Then passing word that we wouldn’t run after the Paks and ask them to let us give them aid. If Ayub valued US support he’d be wise to pick up our “standing invitation” and himself suggest a visit here soon.
My understanding is that the President is inclined to agree on suspending new construction in Peshawar, but wishes to have your views first. This might be worth discussing at your Tuesday lunch with him, and I attach a memo to him summarizing the matter to this end.2