Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, August 2, 1965.

152. Ref: Rawalpindi’s 29.² FonMin Bhutto on consortium postponement.

1. I saw Bhutto at my request just before my departure from Rawalpindi afternoon July 30. He was in personally cordial mood but substance his remarks reflected hard GOP position encased in velvet glove.

2. He expressed regret that President Ayub had so far been unable to meet my request for an appointment. He gave a new and apparently candid reason for Ayub’s avoidance of appointment, namely that Ayub feared that in his anger he would lose control of himself and make some undiplomatic statement to me. Bhutto quoted Ayub as saying he would rather wait until situation had jelled somewhat before he saw me. I told Bhutto that I was accustomed to plain language and President need have no fear of speaking to me as bluntly as he wished. I felt dialogue should have been started, before now, and no inhibitions about diplomatic niceties should stand in the way. Bhutto said he would pass this to President. He said President had authorized him to inform me that he (Bhutto) was fully empowered to make and to receive all representations on behalf of the President in the current crisis.

3. I told Bhutto of our great regret at GOP decision to publicize current difficulties, arousing public opinion and making reestablishment of understanding far more difficult. I specifically deplored Bhutto’s decision to stress (and in our view overstress) to the Assembly the relationship of “certain other matters” to the consortium postponement. I felt this was a fateful decision which called into question the real interest of the GOP in a quiet search for an amicable understanding. In the inflamed and emotional atmosphere now created it was hard to see how any diplomatic dialogue could have much chance of achieving concrete results. Bhutto responded that tradition of complete candor in foreign policy debate in National Assembly made necessary a complete exposure of any issue as fundamental as consortium postponement. The postponement would have leaked out soon anyway and GOP would have been in untenable position with NA if the matter had not been discussed first in Assembly. When I observed that he could have divulged fact of postponement without making inflammatory political charges which were bound to arouse strong emotions, he said GOP had to give its own interpretation of the event to the Assembly. He said patriotic emotions were undoubtedly aroused, but he did not think this would lead to anti-US violence, and government was determined to extend full protection to American nationals and properties. He cited painful action of Dacca police in tear-gassing demonstration university students as evidence of the resolve of the government to keep down anti-American disorders.

4. Bhutto said that Ayub’s deep sense of grievance against US was aggravated by a second look in retrospect at postponement of his projected visit to US last April. With benefit of hindsight, abrupt postponement looked more offensive to Paks now than it did at the time. He said Ayub is convinced that postponement of visit and postponement of consortium are part of some pattern of unsympathetic and indifferent US attitude toward GOP essential interests and views.

5. There was extended discussion of Indian affairs, with Bhutto showing a particular interest in the Indian public record on the confrontation in Viet Nam, and in the US evaluation of Indian record. Obviously Bhutto believes that the Indian position on Viet Nam is less helpful from our standpoint than is the record of Pakistan, and he would like to document this if he can. He would like a list of Indian statements and actions and the American assessment thereof.

6. I told Bhutto in confidence of the deferral of any commitment on Fiscal 1966 aid funds for India, the same as for Pakistan. This meant there was no discrimination in practice, even though India consortium pledging session had been held before present Congressional question arose. He said he had not understood this before and he would inform the President.

7. I told Bhutto candidly that GOP decision to create a public crisis in our relations over consortium postponement issue, and the resultant stir of highly charged and misguided sentiment against the US had created an exceedingly unfavorable impression in the US which is not confined to any one sector of our government or people. The unwillingness of the GOP to get a meaningful dialogue started or do anything else to mend the situation has compounded the GOP mistake as we see it; he [I] said that the way the GOP was handling the problem would strengthen sentiment in the US for seeking a very clear and explicit understanding with Pakistan. Bhutto immediately interpreted this as a threat to take a hard line, and said if the US did take a hard line, Pakistan would immediately take a harder line. He said he knew this could result in a still harder US line, and then Pakistan would have to take a yet harder line. He said there could be an “escalation” in Pakistan as in Viet Nam, except that it would be a “peaceful escalation” here and not a warlike one.

8. Bhutto revealed full knowledge of President Johnson’s message of July 25 to Ayub regarding Viet Nam.³ He said reply would be forthcoming within next few days. Bhutto showed considerable interest in military situation in Viet Nam and asked in detail about USAF bombing of missile sites near Hanoi and whether we had evidence that Soviet personnel were present at sites. He reminded me that GOP had informed US some time back that ChiComs had agreed to permit Soviets to ship military material to North Viet Nam through Chinese territory.

9. Bhutto said GOP would be glad to transmit for us any messages to ChiComs or others in regard to Vietnamese crisis. He said GOP wanted to be helpful. However, it was evident he was only thinking of GOP good offices role as neutral friendly to both sides.

10. Bhutto remained amiable and even somewhat complimentary throughout. Said he would be coming to Karachi about August 5 and would like to have dinner with me there.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Rawalpindi. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 2:29 p.m.
2. Document 159.
3. Johnson sent a message to Ayub on July 25 explaining the decision to expand the U.S. military role in South Vietnam and asking for the support of Ayub’s government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Pakistan-Presidential Correspondence, Part I)