163. Memorandum for the Record1
President’s Meeting with John Bonny
Mr. John Bonny, President of Morrison Knudson, came in on 4 August at his request to give the President an “oral message” from President Ayub. Messrs. Califano and Komer sat in.
When Mr. Bonny transitted Pakistan en route home from Vietnam, he’d been invited by Ghulam Faruq, an old friend and a Pak cabinet minister,2 to see Ayub. Ayub had asked him to deliver a personal message expressing his highest regard for President Johnson and his deepest gratitude for the hospitality which both President and Mrs. Johnson had shown him at their ranch. Regardless of the US decision on the consortium, Pakistan would remain a friend of the US and considered itself irrevocably tied to the future of the West.
Bonny then discussed the highlights of his almost hour-long talk with Ayub. He told Ayub he had just arrived from Vietnam, where M–K was doing military construction work. In Bonny’s opinion the only nations which had stood up and been counted on the US side were Australia and New Zealand. It was time for other countries to stand up and be counted too. Ayub commented if he had the hydrogen bomb, he would adopt exactly the same policies as the US.
Ayub then brought up his visit to Peiping (Bonny commented that all of Ayub’s statements were subsequently confirmed by Ghulam Faruq, who had accompanied Ayub). Chou En-lai attempted to influence Ayub to withdraw from SEATO. However, Ayub replied that SEATO was a defensive alliance. If the Chicoms didn’t violate the territory of other nations, they had nothing to fear from SEATO. If they did, Pakistan would do all in its limited power to defeat this aggression.
Ayub said there was in his opinion a misunderstanding of his apparent appeasement of the Communists. Pakistan was weak so wanted to keep on good terms with its two powerful neighbors.
The President broke in to say that that was Ayub’s business. What concerned the President was his public attacks on us and his general assumption that our money grew on trees. The President had said that we could make no commitments to any country until we got the money [Page 327] (he described his Congressional problems). When he proposed that Ayub postpone his visit till Congress passed the aid bill, the first thing Ayub did was to leak it—thus causing us trouble with the Indians. Also, Ayub’s own Foreign Minister was working against him and against us. Then Ayub said he would have to have a consortium meeting on 27 July, even though we had explained why we would be unable to pledge until after Congress acted.
The President pointed out that he didn’t have a “penny” of authority to spend until then. However, the minute the bill was through, he would be prepared to talk with Ayub. Then he would decide what to do in our national interest. At the moment he thought that providing aid to Pakistan was in our national interest. But if Ayub wanted to “try this case in the papers,” he could take the consequences. Ayub couldn’t “pressure” us. A host still had the right to say when he wanted a guest to come. Moreover, the President thought Ayub was wise enough that he ought to know that if he wanted a showdown, he wouldn’t be able to pressure us. Who was he to tell us that we wanted to be “masters” of Pakistan? The President went on to say that if there was a pro-Pak man in town, it was Lyndon Johnson. But he didn’t like being bullied. Bonny interjected that he didn’t think Ayub felt that way. Ayub had an opposition party and a bad Foreign Minister. The President reiterated that he was Ayub’s friend; he would sit down with Ayub when he got his money. Bonny could tell him that he had an open invite the day the aid bill was signed.
Komer spoke further with Bonny after his meeting with the President. Bonny stressed that Ghulam Faruq, whom he described as the #2 minister in Pakistan, was an extremely close friend. In fact, Bonny was probably his closest American friend. Bonny suggested that if we wanted him to send back a message he could do so through Ghulam Faruq. M–K had a good code which it used repeatedly for communicating with its top man in Pakistan (the only one who knew it). If we thought it advisable, he would be happy to use this channel to Faruq. Bonny felt very strongly that the best way to resolve the crisis was to get Ayub here for a face-to-face talk; so he would be happy to send such a message. He agreed that he would call me next Wednesday upon his return to Washington to find out what we would prefer. He also agreed to have his notes typed up and send them to the President.
Bonny felt that if Ayub came here we could get him to send perhaps even a division to Vietnam. Ayub had described how Chou told him the Chicoms had used less than one division in the border fight with India in late 1962. Chou told Ayub he was astounded by the way the Indians collapsed. Ayub commented that he had always believed one Pakistani division to be worth three Indian divisions, but after hearing [Page 328] Chou he was convinced that one Pak division was equal to at least five Indian divisions.