Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, July 8, 1965, 5:25 p.m.

36. For Ambassador. Our position is that USG does not think it should make aid commitments until Congress has authorized and appropriated funds necessary to carry out commitment.

FYI. Pledging was made in Indian consortium some time ago and was related to last year of five year plan. Pakistan consortium faces question of new five year plan.

US position has nothing to do with problems between India and Pakistan. Our position remains the same as it was before, namely, we hope that these problems can be solved and we have no desire take sides. End FYI.

You should, as appropriate occasions present themselves, make it clear that we do not agree that our inability to make pledge until after US Congress has acted can properly be called “pressure”. It simply means US not in a position to make any commitments until after Congress has acted.

FYI. We have not suggested (Embtel 19)² that Shoaib visit US. Understand President of World Bank has suggested to Ayub that Shoaib visit might be useful. While, if Shoaib decides to come to Washington, we would be happy to discuss problems with him, decision on whether Shoaib comes is entirely in the hands of GOP.

FYI. We do have number of problems which should be discussed and believe these should be discussed in a frank and friendly fashion. However again this is separate from Congressional question mentioned above.³ End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann and cleared by Talbot and in AID by Bell.
2. See footnote 2, Document 142.
3. In telegram 38 to Karachi, July 8, McConaughy was instructed to be governed by the guidance in this telegram in his discussions with Pakistani officials concerning the postponement of the consortium meeting. Once a dialogue was opened, the Department anticipated that there would be a number of issues that could be usefully discussed. Chief among these was the conviction in Washington that “Pakistan and US must find better way to work together towards common goals while avoiding unnecessary attacks on each other over matters on which we are in disagreement.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAK–US)