143. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Washington, July 6, 1965.
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
Pursuant to the President’s desire for an orchestrated US Government effort to convince Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture, it seems worthwhile to explore the possibilities for appropriate supporting action in the intelligence field. One possibility would be to convey the impression that the US is taking positive measures to reduce its dependence on US intelligence facilities in Pakistan, because of its loss of confidence in Pakistani policy. The following options might be explored:
- Suspend currently planned action to expand or improve our facilities, especially those actions which are non-essential (e.g. housing).
- Reduce US personnel strength at our Pakistani facilities. Perhaps this could be done as a temporary measure and one involving non-essential personnel.
- Proceed on a high priority basis to develop alternate facilities in Iran [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the extent feasible. This step might be desirable as insurance in any case. Since actions along these lines could prove costly in terms of intelligence and dollars, it seems essential that both pros and cons be carefully explored. I suggest we prepare to submit recommendations to the President by about 20 July.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 350.09 Pakistan. Top Secret/Sensitive.↩