Office of the Historian

145. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, July 9, 1965, 11:15 a.m.

MAP for India and Pakistan. Attached is a longish memo from Secretary McNamara describing our current programs.2 It breaks down into three categories: (a) FY 65 and prior programs still undelivered—roughly $50 million for Pakistan and $70 million for India; (b) FY 66 programs (roughly $46 million for Pakistan and $50 million for India), which have not yet been approved by DOD and passed as firm to the recipients; and (c) various other requests such as Ayub’s recent plea for submarines, F–104s, and tanks. There are also certain dollar credit sales, which I presume we would not want to interfere with (e.g. the sale of $8 million in ammo to the Paks which you recently approved).

There are political risks in holding up MAP. It has traditionally been most sensitive to the Paks, who regard it as essential vis-à-vis India, and whose military are a major political force. As to the Indians, we could spook them to buy more from the USSR. There is also a real question of whether we want or need to hit either Paks or Indians harder than we have already, lest we trigger an open confrontation by pushing too hard.

Thus there is a case for continuing business as usual, except for continuing to hold off on key items such as F–5s for India and F–104s or submarines for the Paks.

A second alternative would be to handle MAP as you have economic aid: (a) continue with deliveries under FY 65 and prior grant programs for which the funds have been appropriated and commitments in effect made; (b) defer telling either we approve the FY 1966 programs, on the grounds that the funds have not yet been appropriated; (c) simply not respond on major additional requests until we have better indications as to the future attitudes of India and Pakistan.

We are not recommending any action till we can get the views of State and Defense. In the meantime, however, DOD will hold off telling the Paks and Indians about any FY 66 program approvals.3

R. W. Komer 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, July 1965. Secret.↩
  2. The memorandum to the President is dated July 6; not printed. (Ibid., 7/1/65–9/22/65)↩
  3. Johnson responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads: “I would hold everything military etc in abeyance—see me for details.”↩
  4. McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature.↩