132. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State1
58. (1) I had 70-minute meeting with President in Rawalpindi this morning, with Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Office notetaker also present. Prevailing atmosphere was frank and favorable, with dominant note of seriousness. General environment confirmed recent impression there has been some limited GOP re-evaluation of foreign policy situation to our advantage.
(2) We opened with discussion Indo-Pak confrontation crisis. On Rann of Kutch, I expressed our emphatic backing of UK Good Offices effort, and stated our earnest hope that search for settlement formula [Page 278] would be pursued diligently and non-stop until agreement reached. Indicated our disappointment that impasse so protracted. Suggested that if no agreement reached earlier, talks be pursued at London while Ayub and Shastri both at Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Urged Ayub as leader in stronger and more prestigious political position be prepared to go the extra mile of conciliation if necessary in order to achieve agreement. Noted that two sides had already reached agreement in principle substantive question, and that remaining points of disagreement seemed to involve more tactics and supposed face-saving than substance. Ayub responded that he was indeed disposed to go the limit on conciliation and felt that he had already done so. It was Shastri who had refused to agree to immediate termination of dangerous deployment of forces along Pak border which GOI had initiated. And it was Shastri who refused accept an impartial formula for patrol routes in Rann of Kutch during interim period. Ayub said contemptuously that Shastri was “talking through his Dhoti” in his immoderate claims, demands, and threats. Ayub assured me he would continue diligently in the search for agreement and he spoke highly of British efforts.
(3) On larger question of Indo-Pak confrontation outside the Rann, Ayub concurred with deep conviction in my statement of dangerous flammability of situation and wasteful, burdensome cost in economic and development terms of protracted deployment of forces along borders. He stressed Pak anxiety to normalize military posture immediately and deplored Indian refusal. He deprecated Indian HICOM’s recent statement to him that Pak insistence on withdrawal of forces from borders was a challenge of Indian sovereignty. Stated he could not fathom such distorted reasoning, especially since Paks were not even suggesting where Indian forces should be stationed once they are removed from their present unnatural and threatening deployment in immediate border area. Ayub referred to Indian incursions in Kargil area of Kashmir cease-fire line. He said five lightly manned posts well over on Pak side have been completely overrun by overwhelming Indian force and continue to be held by Indians. Said he supposed this was implementation of Indian threat to respond to Rann of Kutch incident at unrelated place “of their own choosing.” Ayub regretted inability of UN military observer group to prevent violations. Said he thought Commanding General Nimmo entirely too senile and feeble to be effective. When I speculated on the desirability of considering a strengthening of UNMOGIP as a means of keeping the peace, he indicated that he would be inclined to give sympathetic consideration to any UN proposal along such lines.
[Here follows discussion of the forthcoming African-Asian Conference at Algiers and an assessment of developments in Southeast Asia.]
[Page 279]7. Ayub appeal for certain additional MAP by grant or credit sale being reported separately.2
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Algiers, London, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.↩
- In telegram 2416 from Karachi, June 18, McConaughy reported that during a June 11 conversation, Ayub made an appeal for limited additional military assistance. Ayub said he had carefully selected a few high-performance items designed to have a deterrent effect on a potential aggressor. He asked for a “moderate” number of higher performance planes to replace the aging F–86 fighters of the Air Force. McConaughy noted that when Ayub referred to higher performance aircraft, presumably he meant F–104s. Ayub also asked for a number of tanks and four submarines. (Ibid., DEF 19–3 US–PAK)↩