133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
2590. Following summary is FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.
Following return from Ottawa where he had seen Prime Minister Shastri, Amb. B.K. Nehru came in to see Secretary June 14. Said Shastri had asked him raise extremely serious matter at highest possible level in USG. Shastri wished inform us that if friends of India and Pakistan desired peace on subcontinent they should exert maximum possible pressure on Pakistan to evacuate Rann of Kutch. India had accepted initial British proposal for negotiations and had thereafter accepted number of changes proposed by Paks. India could make no further concessions and could not tolerate Pak occupation Indian territory. If diplomacy fails, India must use force to drive out Pakistan. GOI is quite aware of political, economic and social consequences of war. It has however reached point at which it can make no further concessions.
In response Secretary commented on appalling consequences of subcontinental war which could not be limited to clash between armed forces. Said casualties would be comparable to those of nuclear exchange. Because of this India and Pakistan almost compelled approach [Page 280] idea of war as inconceivable. Since points of difference regarding British proposal small, Secretary saw great imbalance between nature of differences and consequences of war. Recalling difficult year and a half of discussions he had had with Gromyko following the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting Secretary observed it easy to start war; alternative of working out peaceful solutions much more difficult. India and Pakistan should bear this in mind since consequences of war so enormous.
Secretary said we strongly support British negotiating effort. We will be in touch with British as well as Paks and Indians, but obviously solution this problem not to be found in Washington.
Nehru repeated that India fully aware consequences of war but could not make further concessions. Said Indian view was that President Ayub does not want war but Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed wish avoid settlement and are relying on Communist Chinese support. Shastri was concerned about possibility direct ChiCom intervention. Secretary said he was not in position comment with assurance regarding this. In view of Ayub’s attitude Secretary asked if there could be contact between Pak President and Shastri in London. Nehru said Shastri was committed to Cabinet to avoid discussion Rann of Kutch in London, although subordinate officials may take up question. Nehru also commented on great Indian political pressures on Kutch issue and said if Shastri doesn’t take action his successor will do so.
Asked about situation on Kashmir ceasefire line near Kargil, Nehru responded Indian action there did not represent government policy. Local Indian commander had taken action in disobedience of orders. This was not Indian countermove.2 Indians will clear up this matter, but it may take a few days. Nehru said we could tell Paks we had Indian assurance Kargil situation would be “cleared up”.
During conversation earlier in day, Nehru had made similar presentation to Talbot. In addition Nehru said L.K. Jha had told him Cabinet had agreed permit Kutch situation remain as is until Shastri’s return. If matter not resolved by then there would be nothing to do but employ force. In response Talbot focused on narrow margin of differences separating India and Pakistan and great need for further effort reach agreement in order to avoid disaster.
Talbot conveyed above to British Minister (Stewart) June 14. Stewart whether Indian approach was tactical maneuver to involve US [Page 281] or whether Shastri’s position really as weak as this suggests. Talbot replied Indian position sounds unbelievable but cannot be discounted. Said this next week in London would be of crucial importance. British may wish consider what influence they can bring to bear. Also noted we had told Indians we support British negotiating effort and consequently we wish avoid getting into substance. Talbot made it clear that any action we might take with Paks would await UK reaction Indian approach.
Stewart said he would inform London of above tonight and we could expect London’s reactions June 15.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider on June 14, cleared by Judd in BNA, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London, and repeated to Karachi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.↩
- On June 16, Indian Charge Banerjee called on Talbot and presented a paper giving the Indian position concerning Kargil, which differed sharply from that conveyed by Nehru to Rusk on June 14. The paper alleged that Pakistani forces had initiated the conflict in the Kargil region and had been repulsed by Indian forces, which were “obliged” to occupy two posts on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. Nehru was with Shastri in London and unavailable for comment. (Telegram 2604 to New Delhi, June 16; ibid.)↩