131. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Mac—
Leaning on the Paks. Lest anyone should think we’re utterly immobile, we’ve already done a few things (though I’ve had an uphill fight all the way):
- 1.
- We’ve stalled two years, and are still, on two squadrons F–104s, for which Paks are bleeding.
- 2.
- At recent Consortium pre-pledging session, we didn’t even mention a figure, but instead joined World Bank, UK, and Germans in beating up Paks on certain economic conditions.
- 3.
- We didn’t come through with new PL 480 agreement Paks wanted but simply extended present one six months with no add-ons (because Paks haven’t complied with reporting provisions).
- 4.
- We turned down $25–30 million Roopur atomic power plant (on technical grounds that Paks couldn’t market that much power).
- 5.
- We’re stalling on $120 million Karachi steel mill (for which Paks are panting). Real grounds are that ExIm refused so much as a 2/3 share, so AID got cold feet and is doing a new survey.
Fascinating thing is that all the above have apparently been taken by the Paks as political signals, when in fact the last three were straight economic in origin (so was the second in large part). This just shows you the perils of heliographing to parties that don’t speak the same language. At any rate I’ve told AID that, whatever they may have intended, they did a swell job.
New signals. Instead of special envoys, or tough talk just now, I favor keeping up the above line. For ostensibly legitimate economic reasons, we keep stalling and diddling. The Paks take it all as really political, but it’s that much harder for them to confront us:
- 1.
- Postpone Pak pledging session a month, on grounds we need a better answer to US and IB queries. This will rock the Paks, and buy us another month to see if they come around. It also buys more time to decide how much we’ll pledge.
- 2.
- Keep stalling on Karachi steel mill, new PL 480 agreement, etc.
- 3.
- Hold up deliveries on other MAP items besides planes. Stalling on tanks and APCs would painfully remind Ayub we don’t want him [Page 277] using US-supplied armor in places like the Rann of Kutch. Also, Rusk just approved selling some ammo to the Paks.2 Why?
- 4.
-
Now that McNamara has spoken his golden words, why not operate on the most sensitive nerve of all—Peshawar? If we cut back a little on personnel or new construction there, it would shake Pak confidence in what they regard as their hole card. They’d really be shaken if they thought we were getting ready to pull out. Such a signal would have to be carefully handled, lest the Paks think Aziz Ahmed’s recent approach scared us off. What say we clue Raborn/Helms on LBJ’s strong views, and ask them to look into this.
We’re embarked on a risky course, and it will take steady nerves, because Ayub will probably growl back before retreating. But we have a clear mandate now, and I’m really using it now to move the way we should have long since.