Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, April 27, 1965, 8:02 p.m.

1217. Rann of Kutch. Talbot called in Pak Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed today to reinforce Ambassador McConaughy’s earlier representations of U.S. concern re Rann to GOP Foreign Secretary. Talbot said that we are also having talks in New Delhi.² He said that what troubles us most is that apparently for first time since Kashmir cease fire, military forces of two countries are engaged in organized conflict. We see very considerable risks and dangers ahead in this situation.

As Ambassador knew, Senate recently reduced FY-66 MAP by $115 million. This decision was reversed after intensive efforts. Cut was assigned to India, Pakistan, Greece and Turkey. This mood is fed by present situation, and implications for subcontinent cannot be ignored. Aziz Ahmed told Ambassador McConaughy MAP-supplied tanks were being used in conflict. Aziz Ahmed also indicated that GOP would welcome clarification from U.S. of interpretation our military assistance agreement regarding use of MAP equipment in such dispute. Talbot said he wished state our position in response to Aziz’s request and covered points in Deptel 1200 to Karachi.³ He said it was quite evident Pakistan’s attack on Biar Bet is inconsistent with maintaining “legitimate self-defense.”

Our larger concern is to bring this situation to an end before it assumes importance of another Kashmir, creating deep frictions between two nations. We earnestly hope both countries can find way to arrange cease fire.

Ambassador said he was not familiar with latest Karachi talks. However as he understood it Bhutto’s April 15 statement and GOP’s letter to Security Council stood as basis Pakistan’s position. He recalled that area above 24th Parallel was regarded in pre-partition days as part of Sind. Therefore in his view not correct to say that this territory disputed and question of use of MAP equipment in disputed territory did not arise. What was important was to define what is disputed territory.

He continued that war talk had been coming from Indian side. Indian allegations of Pakistani mobilization have been categorically denied while GOI has admitted to mobilization. Ambassador noted Ayub’s Dacca speech and contrasted President’s peaceful remarks with Indian statements relating alleged Pak casualties. Looking at it from Washington, Kashmir incidents, Dahagram and Rann of Kutch seemed to fall into pattern of planned Indian aggression.

Ambassador stated that this is a case where U.S. should firmly come to Pakistan’s aid. He recalled Under Secretary Ball’s assurances of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in event of Indian aggression.⁴ Pakistan obviously cannot match India in duplicity. Already India has presented better case internationally than Pakistan. Ambassador asked for Talbot’s views on what U.S. would do.

Talbot said that in first instance cease fire should be arranged. He said it should not be beyond ingenuity of disputants to find way to bring prompt end to fighting, particularly since both countries are in agreement on desirability of cease fire as well as negotiations to resolve impasse. Following cease fire both sides might set up machinery to settle disputes of this type.

Ambassador commented that such machinery does exist with regard to West Pakistan-Indian frontier. Pakistan certainly wants peaceful solution but India charges of Pakistan wanting to broaden the conflict and Chinese-Pakistan collusion indicate opposite view holds for India.

Ambassador said that apart from tanks he was not aware of what other MAP equipment may be in use. He thought that it might be useful to examine “at leisure” 1961 Kennedy-Ayub communiqué⁵ which he believed had extended scope of use of MAP equipment.

Talbot closed by noting U.S. can foresee very serious consequences both on subcontinent and outside unless there is cessation in present hostilities.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William L. Simmons in NEA/SOA, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London, New Delhi, and CINCMEAFSA.
2. Talbot also discussed the Rann of Kutch situation with Indian Ambassador Nehru on April 27, and argued for the wisdom of a cease-fire agreement. (Telegram 2245 to New Delhi, April 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64–6/65)
3. Telegram 1200 to Karachi, April 24, defined the U.S. legal position regarding the use of MAP equipment in disputed territories, such as the Rann of Kutch. MAP equipment was furnished with the clear understanding that it was required for internal security, legitimate self-defense, or collective security. The Department concluded that the United States could not unilaterally determine where the disputed border was for the purpose of establishing the right or wrong of the use of equipment supplied under MAP agreements. The Department also did not feel that either Pakistan or India could offer assurances that the equipment was being used for internal security or legitimate self-defense. Therefore the United States was not willing to countenance the use of MAP equipment in disputed areas such as the Rann of Kutch. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK)
4. In a conversation with Ayub in Rawalpindi on September 5, 1963, Ball reiterated the assurance that the United States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of aggression from any source. The conversation was reported in telegram 236 from Tehran, September 5; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, Document 328.
5. For the joint communiqué issued on July 31, 1961, at the conclusion of the Washington portion of a State visit to the United States by Ayub, see Department of State Bulletin, August 7, 1961, pp. 240–241.