Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, April 27, 1965, 1530Z.

2040. Embtel 2039.²

1. Events relating to Rann of Kutch clash seem to be propelling us toward milestone in US relations with Pakistan and India. Thanks to needlessly belligerent and self-centered actions of both countries, not only are we faced with a major crisis in Indo-Pak relations, but major crises in US-Indian and US-Pak relations. Immediate issues are of course fighting in Rann of Kutch and use of MAP equipment there by Paks.

But, in fact, much broader issues involving our position on Subcontinent are actually at stake. Rann of Kutch has made it clear that US and UK cannot safely remain aloof from intramural Indo-Pak disputes although they are not of our making. US assistance is significant factor in enhanced military capabilities of both countries. In case of Pakistan five and one-half of its seven and one-half divisions are MAP supported. In the case of India, US military aid and US assistance in defense production area serve indirectly if not directly to upgrade appreciably India’s ability to sustain operations like Rann of Kutch engagements. This broadest context of issue posed by Rann of Kutch is how to avoid frustration of US efforts, undertaken in both countries at enormous cost, which would surely result from enlarged and prolonged hostilities.

2. Regardless of merits India’s claim that Paks are employing MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch for aggression or Pakistani contention that its actions are justifiable defensive reactions to Indian encroachments disrupting long established equilibrium in upper half of Rann, present situation is not tolerable for us in terms our essential interests in Subcontinent.

We are faced thus by a most crucial dilemma. To withdraw MAP support from Pakistan, however justifiable in the abstract would be to open here a Pandora’s box of outright neutralism and sweeping policy reorientation. MAP is lifeblood of Pak national security. If Paks are cut off from MAP because of its use in disputes with India, where facts (other than shared culpability both sides) have always been almost impossible to sort out and with Indians still benefitting from US military equipment while still not entirely dependent on it, Paks will consider that they have no choice but to look elsewhere for military support and guarantees against aggression. In our view, it would be difficult to over-estimate the emotional impact of this issue in Pakistan, or the adverse effect on the American presence here, including without doubt status of our special facilities, that would flow from a rupture of the Military Assistance Program. Yet, to decline to control in some effective way, improper or questionable Pak employment of MAP equipment would be impossible to defend not only before Congress and in India, but in terms our ability to exercise influence through MAP on Paks.

3. We see no clear answer to this dilemma. To move all the way to either of these alternatives would have far-reaching ominous implications, forcing very choice between India and Pakistan we wish to avoid. In the case before us, we consider that the only course we can readily live with is one which makes the choice unnecessary in present inflamed circumstances [garble] one of either reversion to 1960 arrangements in Rann of Kutch, including agreed ground rules, or an immediate and unconditional cease fire. We might thus avoid involvement in merits of case or need for decision for the present on the MAP issue—although we probably must face up to latter over longer run. We urge full weight of US Government be put behind British good offices effort (Embtel 2033),³ both here and in Delhi.

4. To reinforce this effort, Paks must be admonished again at highest level that US MAP programs, apart from legal interpretations, clearly jeopardized as a defensible practical proposition by continuation of Rann of Kutch fighting. I believe I can get this across to President Ayub in a form that he will comprehend without undue resentment.

At same time, responsibility for concoction and vigorous stirring of Rann of Kutch witches’ brew rests equally on Pak and Indian shoulders. Our warning to GOP therefore should be matched with similar emphatic warning to GOI, particularly in view GOI threats to extend conflict to other areas, apparent Indian interest in compounding our difficulties in Pakistan, and Indian exploitation of [garble—closer?] Soviet ties. Both GOP and GOI must be faced with fact that aid to both will be imperiled if they do not buckle down to business of arranging immediate cease fire.

McConaughy

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64–7/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 1:50 p.m.
2. In telegram 2039 from Karachi, April 27, McConaughy reported on a conversation with Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed in which Ahmed told him that India rejected Pakistan’s proposal for a cease-fire. Ahmed said that in light of the Indian rejection, Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch would have to “stay put.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK)
3. See footnote 3, Document 109.