Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

113. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, April 28, 1965, 11 a.m.

CAP 65138. Eyes Only for Bowles from Bundy. Have just seen your 3057² asking help on pending matters before you return here mid-May. We are fully and sympathetically aware of hectic situation in subcontinent and will do our best to push some of these matters forward. However, with all the candor you have come to expect via this channel, let me warn against great expectations just now. With Vietnam in the forefront of all minds, there is simply not likely to be the kind of constructive focus on the issues you raise which is necessary to push them through.

Moreover, while tactical considerations may argue for early gestures before Shastri goes to Moscow, we still see merit in reserving some of the items you propose till we can fit them better into package approach being considered here, rather than dishing them out piecemeal. Two-year PL 480 commitment now, for example, might deprive us of major leverage before we have fully worked out what we want Indians to do in return, at least in agriculture sector. A one-year, frankly interim, agreement might suffice for our immediate purpose.

As for F–5A, we see little chance of promising aircraft now when Paks and perhaps Indians are using our MAP for purposes far afield from what we intended.³

In sum, my reading of Washington end is that the way of wisdom is not to push too hard on big new programs till we can revalidate our Indian enterprise and get the aid bill through. Here we must grant the President’s own unparalleled sense of the rocky road the aid bill is travelling and his strong desire not to rock the boat till he knows what’s in his pocket. Nor does Vietnam, where the course we have to take will not win us many short term plaudits overseas, ease the problem.

So timing is everything just now. On this score, Komer and I strongly urge that you postpone your home leave for six weeks or so. When we heard you were coming, we thought it wise on your behalf to check with the President, and this is his own distinct preference. Aside from the value of having you at the helm in Delhi during a ticklish period in US/Indian relations, we may need your guiding hand in handling Vietnam affairs with the Indians. Equally important, you could not come back now without talking India and it is simply not a propitious time to do so. You would inevitably be caught in the backwash of the Shastri affair, and have to answer embarrassing queries. Even strictly home leave might be misconstrued, and you couldn’t really come back without a Washington leg.

These are difficult times, not least for you, and we all appreciate your gallant handling of affairs at your end. I also realize how difficult it is in Delhi to get the full flavor of the situation here. However, I’m sure you will understand the President’s own judgment as to why the timing would be better, and your presence here more productive, when our own affairs on the Hill and in Vietnam are more fully sorted out.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Immediate. [text not declassified]
2. In telegram 3057 from New Delhi, April 27, Bowles raised the question of pending decisions on three issues he felt it was important to move forward on before his return to Washington in mid-May. The two most important related to the Indian requests for a 2-year agreement on P.L. 480 assistance and for F–5 fighter aircraft. Bowles urged positive decisions on both, although he recognized that in view of the fighting in the Rann of Kutch it would not be possible to announce a decision to provide F–5s to India for some time. He also urged action on his proposal for the creation of a binational cultural foundation, noting that a decision had been pending for more than a year. (Ibid., Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64–6/65)
3. On May 8, Rusk informed Bowles, in a personal cable, that the decision had been made to defer a response to the Indian request for F–5 aircraft. (Telegram 2348 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–INDIA)