Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1500Z.

136. Ref: Tripoli’s 135.²

1. Foreign Minister Bishti, with tone of deep regret, told me today of King’s decision request implementation withdrawal from Wheelus. He had made similar request re British bases earlier to Amb. Sarrell.

2. In acknowledging demarche, I made these points:

(A) I would report approach immediately to Washington.

(B) I regretted I had not had opportunity discuss matter with King prior his decision. King had frequently shown great concern over Libyan security and dependence on U.S. role that security. He knew degree to which our military facilities represented symbol our interest in Libya.

(C) While base was only one facet of U.S.-Libyan relations, Libyan request for implementation of withdrawal at this time will be interpreted by Cairo as victory for its tactics of untruth. This was time for Libya to demonstrate its independence. One cannot avoid interpreting recent events primarily as effort by Cairo with Soviet support liquidate U.S.-U.K. presence and gain domination in Middle East and North Africa. While it might be Libyan hope base withdrawal would remove irritant in relations with Cairo, Cairo almost certain to find other means attacking present regime and Libya’s wealth.

(D) Request coming at this time cannot but further shake confidence of Americans to Libya and in possibilities investing Libya. It would seem confirm malicious charges of U.S.-U.K. involvement.

(E) In 1964, Libya had requested U.S. liquidate base and had immediately begun public and Parliamentary pressure apparently on assumption U.S. not prepared discuss issue. This did not help its resolution. I strongly hoped that Libya would give U.S. adequate time for reply and that whatever results could be handled in manner which has as its objective preservation close U.S.-Libyan ties.

3. Bishti, who obviously not happy with decision, acknowledged truth these statements, but said government under intense pressures and believed those essential steps in its program of restoring order. In response my question regarding public announcement, he said one might come today or, at latest, during Kuwait meeting Foreign Ministers on 16th. He said he hoped accompany any statement in Kuwait repeating Libyan denial of any use Wheelus for aggression against Arabs.

4. Comment and recommendation: This not unexpected, although GOL had given impression it was seeking preserve bases. Pressures for satisfactory posture at Kuwait and possible summit meeting undoubtedly weighed in balance. We should also keep in mind that U.K., given pressures for withdrawals, may well welcome opportunity to reduce presence here. In such situation we have at least these alternatives:

(A) Reply that we have an agreement until 1970 and state that we believe this agreement should be respected. We should, if take this approach, be prepared for harassment and, perhaps, violence. This would require a determination of the cost we wish to pay.

(B) Make further argumentation with GOL and King against decision. I attempted, before this demarche, see King on general situation, was told he was indisposed and audience could not be at least for week. I believe we should assume GOL will make statement and commit itself this policy before we can make further arguments.

(C) Delay reply until situation cools. Despite my statement to Bishti. I am almost certain GOL will commence public pressure against base in belief we are stalling. This, in my view, not desirable.

(D) Inform the GOL that the USG as a result of its regular review of overseas base requirements had already reached the decision to liquidate the base and would therefore be prepared to begin discussion to that end.

(E) Make immediate reply that, in accordance request GOL and our position in 1964 we are prepared resume discussions leading to withdrawal and will make best effort present time table within one month. GOL will in meantime wish organize committee meet with us. I favor this approach since it will serve hopefully delay further discussion until heat of present crisis subsides, we can take further soundings locally and with UK and can then judge whether time table we present will propose long or short period withdrawal.

5. While appreciating how short time is, I believe there is value in my replying to GOL along foregoing lines prior Kuwait meeting Saturday.

Newsom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN.
2. Dated June 15. (Ibid.)