Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

8. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, May 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Action Plan for Algeria

Current Basis of Action:

U.S. policies toward Algeria were set for FY 1963 and FY 1964 by the response to NSAM 211 forwarded to the White House on January 31, 1963. A copy is attached (Tab A).²

Purpose of Current Plan:

The purpose of the current plan is to bring home to President Ben Bella personally and to officials of the Algerian Government the risks of departure from non-alignment and the importance of the support the United States is giving to Algeria without directly challenging the present regime in a manner which Ben Bella is likely to exploit. (An inventory of statements and actions by Ben Bella and the Algerian Government inimical to the U.S. is attached at Tab B.)

Premises of Action Plan:

1. Algeria, by size, potential, and location is of sufficient importance to the United States to justify efforts to retain a position of influence in the country, even in the face of current Algerian attitudes. We cannot abandon Algeria.

2. Ben Bella’s endorsement of Communist-line positions on world affairs, with the notable exception of Germany, during his recent trip to the Soviet Union results both from an emotional attachment to situations he considers revolutionary and anti-imperialist and from the desire to find aid in sufficient quantities from other sources to reduce his dependence on France. While the United States can, perhaps, moderate his expression of these views and persuade him to avoid further attacks on U.S. programs, there is little likelihood of a basic change in his militantly revolutionary outlook.

3. Soviet interest in Algeria is primarily in terms of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the lavish treatment given Ben Bella in the USSR was primarily a response to the Chou En-lai trip to Algeria. It was a response to the new challenge to the Soviets from the Chinese for influence in the third world. There are certain limitations on Soviet intentions towards Algeria, in that they are probably hopeful of obtaining Algerian support for their world positions, rather than acquiring a new satellite, which, like Cuba, would be an expensive drain on their resources and which, like Cuba, would not be under their control.

4. Ben Bella, after the successful FLN conference in April, appears to be in firm control in Algeria, although he may face some opposition from Army and Muslim elements to his closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Other opposition to him is weak and divided.

5. The French are probably at least as concerned as we are about the prospect of increased Soviet influence in Algeria. They also have been the primary targets of Ben Bella’s revolutionary activities with the result that except for military bases and the petroleum industries, little remains of the Evian Accords under which Algeria obtained independence. Despite this situation the French have continued their assistance to Algeria at the rate of over 200 million dollars per annum, and they have neither found it possible, nor advisable, to put heavy pressure on the regime. Once the need for nuclear testing in the Sahara disappears (presumably in 1966) and if Ben Bella eliminates French petroleum interests, the French will undoubtedly take a harder look at Algeria and cut their aid, although for reasons of proximity they will remain concerned with developments in Algeria. Meanwhile Algerian dependence on French aid and technicians may have exerted some restraint on Ben Bella, although not on matters of less interest to France such as Cuba or Vietnam.

French development aid, in any case, is likely to decline from its present $200,000,000 annual figure but would still be significant even if reduced by half. Conceivably, upon sufficient provocation, direct French aid might be canceled abruptly as was the case in Tunisia this month. An even more serious consequence of clean break in the French-Algerian relationship would be the disruption of the total trade pattern including the sudden loss of vital French markets for Algerian exports staples, petroleum, wines, citrus, vegetables, etc.

6. The U.S. policy has been to maintain some influence through substantial food distribution activities, work relief and demonstration programs in the rural areas, and a small medical presence, while leaving to France the primary role. The United States is not in a position to match either the French ($200,000,000 annually) or Soviet ($228,000,000 in credits plus substantial military assistance) aid. We can find ways to bring home to Ben Bella more forcefully the importance of our food program and of his relationship to the United States; we would find great difficulty in supplanting either of the present major donors.

7. Directly and indirectly, we can bring home to Ben Bella the risk to his non-aligned role in Africa and Asia and to his other relationships of his growing political support of the Soviet Union and its world-wide policies. Other Arabs and Africans do not favor so close an alignment nor so close an involvement in the Cold War. To be effective, this must be done without any direct public challenge of a type he can exploit to strengthen his own position.

8. Through widening our contacts in Algeria, we can seek to influence Ben Bella through his associates and can possibly identify and become acquainted with potential future Algerian leadership more friendly to the West. At the moment, with the opposition in disarray, there is little likelihood of our being able to effect any immediate change and few possibilities for other U.S. political action.

Proposed Courses of Action:

1. Explore fully with the French the current situation in Algeria and the possibilities of influencing the course of events. France remains the key to the Western position in Algeria and her actions will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of our approach.

2. Strong demarche to Ben Bella on his recent statements in the Soviet Union (telegram already sent). Prior to such demarche recall Ambassador Porter to Washington for consultations, thereby lending the full weight of the U.S. to this demarche. Make similar demarche to the Algerian Ambassador here.

3. Make known to selected African governments our concern over Ben Bella’s increasing alignment with Communist cause, having in mind the attitude these governments may take at OAU meeting in July and toward proposed and planned non-alignment conferences. We have in mind particularly:

a. United Arab Republic. Nasser cannot be too pleased at this development.

b. Tunisia.

c. Morocco.

d. Guinea.

e. Nigeria.

f. Senegal.

4. Encourage those African and Latin American states friendly to the West which do not have diplomatic missions in Algeria to establish them.

5. Pay occasional conspicuous attention to Tunisia and Morocco, avoiding actions which would suggest we are favoring Morocco in the Moroccan-Algerian dispute. Consider the possibility of visits to both countries by a high-ranking U.S. official in the near future, bearing in mind that timing should take into account, in addition to the reaction of Algeria to our demarche, both Tunisian and Moroccan difficulties with France over land.

6. Maintain our aid programs, but leave to the Algerians the initiative on particular actions required to continue the individual projects. Because of Algerian administrative shortcomings, we have generally pressed them to sign the necessary documents. Letting them come to us when the programs appear to be faltering might be one way of demonstrating to them more dramatically the value of the programs while, at the same time, demonstrating our lessened interest.

7. Discourage Algerian delegations to the United States of high-level officials or ranking political figures. We wish to avoid giving Ben Bella opportunities to point to his balanced attitude as demonstrated by good will delegations. At the same time, increase visits of lower level technical and administrative personnel and non-governmental Algerians to the United States and contacts with such persons in Algeria.

8. Offer limited opportunities to Algerian Army officers for special training in the United States.

9. Examine the U.S.I.S. program in Algeria (already assigned a high priority) to determine where it might be strengthened.

We are forwarding the foregoing courses of action for consideration. We are not making specific recommendations on other than steps 1 and 2 at this time, pending the results of our conversations with the French.

Recommendation:

That you approve steps 1 and 2 above as immediate courses of action.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and cleared by Jones in NE, Kleine in AID, Imhof in EUR, and Fine in AFP.
2. None of the tabs is attached. For NSAM No. 211, December 14, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, p. 113. The January 31, 1963, response to NSAM No. 211 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 211.
3. The source text is a copy bearing no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.