Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

71. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 36.5–65

Washington, April 22, 1965.

LIBYA

The Problem

To assess the situation and probable trends in Libya over the next several years.

Conclusions

A. As long as King Idris remains active, his conservative regime will probably continue to be relatively stable and pro-Western in orientation. However, Idris will almost certainly make some concessions to the growing educated, reformist elements in Libyan society. In particular, if he came to feel that his throne was threatened by domestic pressures, perhaps stimulated by the UAR, he would be likely to demand fairly rapid withdrawal by the US from Wheelus Air Base. The chances are fairly good that the US can retain Wheelus for two or three years, but the likelihood will decrease over a longer period, and will be particularly dependent on the King’s health and effective control. (Paras. 1–10)

B. The chances are better than even that Crown Prince Hasan will succeed to the throne, though only as a constitutional figurehead. Indeed, the monarchy itself may not long survive, as nationalist army officers and civilians might seek to establish a republic in the post-Idris era. Such an Arab nationalist regime would be less friendly to the West. Even conservative leaders may see their interests served by setting up a republic. A growing sense of Libyan nationalism and a desire to keep control of the country’s oil wealth will make appeals for UAR intervention progressively less likely. (Paras. 11–13, 21–26)

C. Libya is now a major oil producer, and the massive inflow of oil revenues is creating serious domestic problems. Living standards are rising, but the gap between the rich and the poor will remain despite the government’s efforts at economic development. The government’s present oil policies are likely to continue for at least a few years, and nationalization of the oil industry is unlikely under any regime. (Paras. 14–20)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except for the AEC representative and the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.