Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

572. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, November 15, 1968.

WWR:

SUBJECT

• Rhodesian Talks

The odds now favor some break on Rhodesia in the next few weeks. Here’s a quick look:

1. Wilson is clearly anxious to be rid of this problem. British public sympathy for the black Rhodesians has gradually melted into resignation or indifference. Sensing the moment, powerful economic interests in the City are pressuring the PM for a “practical” settlement.

2. Though he seemed steadfast in the Fearless talks, Wilson made important concessions on the question of legitimizing Rhodesian independence. The last obstacle was the old British ace-in-the-hole: an external guarantee that the white-dominated Rhodesian Parliament wouldn’t renege, after the fact, on the negotiated constitutional provisions for eventual majority rule. Wilson’s vehicle for the guarantee was a Privy Council—with a majority of Commonwealth watchdogs—to review and annul any infringement of the process. Smith, of course, rejected the idea on the grounds that the Council posed an unacceptable violation of Rhodesian sovereignty.

3. Now the British have gone back to Salisbury with a very attractive compromise to dilute the powers of the Privy Council. The rather elaborate legal formula is described in the attached cable.² The point is that it papers over another British retreat.

4. If Smith et al. buy this proposal—and most of us think they will—there could be a formal settlement within 2–3 weeks. State counts no more than 30 or 40 Labor votes against Wilson on this, and with overwhelming Conservative support he’ll easily carry the House.

Our Reaction

In the short run, the consensus around town is that we adopt a wait-and-see attitude pending the reaction of the black Rhodesians. No one is altogether sure how nationalist leaders like Nkomo and Sithole will view the settlement from the Salisbury jail, or how the two squabbling terrorist organizations in Zambia will respond. Waiting on local reactions is a plausible line in public. And it should do as a first answer to Kaunda, who has already written to the President about the British “sell out.” Nick Katzenbach will be sending over a memo recommending this tack, along with a proposed reply to Kaunda. I’m abreast of the policy-making process in State.

The Long Run

This position is likely to blunt the initial African outcry when Wilson announces his deal. It does give everybody a chance to ponder the legal merits of the agreement. I’m afraid, though, that agony is inevitable.

However judicious the formula, the fact will remain that Wilson gave up independence without majority rule. In African eyes, the Privy Council will be a poor substitute even for the gossamer dream of British intervention. Nkomo and Sithole have a calculated taste for martyrdom. The counter pressures within the terrorist groups (who are beginning to make slight dents in Rhodesian security) will be enormous. Kaunda, who soon faces an election, and Nyerere, who has to keep an eye on his Chinese patrons, will have compelling reasons to reject the settlement out of hand.

This adds up to a judgment that no realistic Rhodesian settlement could carry the black Africans with it. We buy time by waiting for a fair reading of the African reaction. We may even purchase a few more months, amid mounting criticism, by urging that the settlement be given a fair chance to operate.

But sooner or later, the President or his successor will face a tortuous decision: our moral and political position in black Africa vs. a public break with the British (on what will be celebrated in their next election as a major accomplishment of the Wilson Government).³

Roger

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret.
2. Telegram 14297 from London, November 13; not printed.
3. On November 16, the head of the British negotiating team in Salisbury announced that the principal stumbling block to a settlement was the Rhodesian refusal to accept the British proposal that the Privy Council in London constitute the court of final appeal against racially discriminatory laws in Rhodesia. No British-Rhodesian settlement was reached.