56. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Talks with the Libyans on Wheelus base started 29 April and recessed. Lewis Jones, our Minister in London, launched them as our special negotiator and ran into a stone wall. The Libyans insisted on talking only about ending our tenure, so he never got a chance to do more than hint at our plan for gradually transferring nominal control of Wheelus to them, while we stay on as a tenant.

Now State and Defense are hammering out our position for the second round, probably in early June. Jones’ formula is to agree in principle to talk about leaving Wheelus but to ask the Libyans for 6 months to [Page 87] study timing, alternatives and other complicated aspects of closing down. This would get us past the touchy period of the Eshkol visit’s aftermath; the Arab summit (August), Organization for African Unity (July), and non-aligned (October) conferences; the current UK-Arab flare-up over South Arabia; and our own elections. However, Defense is still studying this idea, and State will probably end up treating it as a fallback position.

Events have overtaken Rusk’s action plan (Tab B),2 but it would be helpful for you to note it to show your continued concern. We also want to be sure the agencies don’t lose sight of our long-run interests in Libya while concentrating on the base negotiations. NSAM at Tab A for your signature will keep the heat on.3

R.W. Komer 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret.
  2. See Document 53.
  3. Attached but not printed. The NSAM was never issued.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.