Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

489. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, November 9, 1965, 12:48 p.m.

857. Subject: Rhodesia.

1. From Wilson-Smith correspondence, supplemented by US–UK discussions in London, Salisbury and here, it appears that neither British nor Rhodesians believe Royal Commission will produce mutually acceptable constitutional basis for Rhodesian independence. From outset British have conceived of Commission as device gain time. British believe Smith willing go along, with same objective in mind. In addition, according Emboffs here, Wilson attempting widen split in Rhodesian Front. Pursuit these objectives obviously carries risk replacement Smith by more militant pro-UDI Prime Minister in Rhodesia. It is conceivable, if Smith finally commits self publicly or privately to work on alternative to UDI, that British may seek U.S. help to shore up his position.

2. Emboffs believe if discussion of Commission and subsequent Commission activities can be dragged out until January, prospect of UDI substantially reduced at least for several months, primarily because Rhodesian tobacco farmers unable at that late date switch to marketable food crops.

3. British appear believe five basic principles on which they have stood (second paragraph Depcirtel 597)² need not be compromised as this game is played out, although Emboffs here acknowledge pressure to compromise becoming stronger as exchange continues. However, they say Parliament would not accept solution which departs from principles and, in any case, departure would put such powerful weapon in hands Conservatives to use against Wilson that he most unlikely compromise on principles. We believe consequences might be equally serious within Labour Party and in relations with Liberals. In addition we assume Commonwealth pressures would be in direction maintenance principles. Our concern with maintenance of five principles is not only that they offer long-term solution most acceptable to Rhodesian majority, but also that they provide framework within which we committed support British. We believe British share our view that continuing adherence to principles vital to maintenance both British and U.S. positions elsewhere in Africa.

4. Disillusioning results Wilson’s soundings of African nationalist opinion in Rhodesia served as reminder that nationalist intransigence may well become main obstacle not only to ultimate resolution Rhodesian problem but also to successful pursuit current British tactical objectives. If nationalists refuse cooperate with Commission or denounce in advance any Commission recommendation other than immediate far-reaching revisions of constitution, use of Commission to gain time would be jeopardized. Intransigent African attitudes likely become firmer as result greater isolation which may well result from National Emergency measures.

5. In light foregoing, we see four general problem areas:

A. Smith’s position on time-gaining devices and UDI, reactions to his position within Rhodesian Front, and possible British decision support him if he agrees seek alternative to UDI.

B. Pressures to compromise five principles and how British will meet them.

C. Lack of constructive attitude on part Rhodesian African nationalists.

D. If Royal Commission time-gaining gambit works, problems resulting from lack of progress toward genuine solution.

6. Would appreciate action addressees’ comments this analysis and recommendations re how meet problems posed paragraph 5, insofar they pertinent at your post. Analysis should be closely held. You should not approach host government in connection drawing up your comments and recommendations.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney on November 8; cleared by Williams, Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs Francis T. Underhill, Judd, and Buffum; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Blantyre, Canberra, Dar-es-Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Nairobi, Ottawa, Pretoria, Salisbury, Wellington, and USUN. Repeated to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Circular telegram 597, October 12, listed the British Government’s five conditions for granting independence: 1) Unimpeded progress toward majority rule; 2) Firm provisions against any retrogression by the Rhodesian Government on constitutional guarantees for majority rule; 3) Immediate constitutional advance for Africans; 4) Progress in reduction of racial discrimination including repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; and 5) Satisfactory evidence that the majority of Rhodesia’s population accepted the present 1961 Constitution as a basis for independence. (Ibid.)