457. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Southern Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The Secretary
    • The Under Secretary
    • William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
    • Richard I. Phillips, P/ON
    • Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
  • UK
    • Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary
    • The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
    • Sir Eric Roll, Economic Minister, British Embassy
    • Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office
    • Michael Stewart, British Minister
    • Reginald M. Hadow, Head of Foreign Office News Department
    • John N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
    • Kenneth Scott, First Secretary, British Embassy

Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker said that the outgoing British Government on election day had informed the Southern Rhodesian Government that they would not send observers to the independence referendum. The present British Government had confirmed this action. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley had offered to have talks with Prime Minister Smith, if he could also see Sithole and Nkomo. Prime Minister Wilson had also asked Smith if he would come immediately to London for talks. Smith had refused, as expected, but did say he would come after the referendum.

Mr. Gordon Walker went on to say that HMG would be issuing a statement on October 27 warning the Southern Rhodesians of the grave consequences resulting from a unilateral declaration of independence. HMG wanted to shock the Southern Rhodesians and stop them if it could. At the very least, HMG hoped to encourage resistance to Smith. [Page 789] Smith has until this afternoon to agree that there will be no unilateral declaration of independence. Otherwise, the statement will be issued. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped that the U.S. would be able to support HMG in this matter. Perhaps we could issue a statement showing our support.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. did support HMG’s policy and that we would follow the British lead.2 He inquired as to the solidity of the white group in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that it was difficult to say. If the British did nothing, the police and the army would probably go along with Smith. With the statement that HMG was going to make, it was just possible that Smith would have a difficult time putting through unilateral independence. The Foreign Secretary noted that the statement was a little vague on trade. This was because HMG realized that the Southern Rhodesians could get help from South Africa and the British, in any case, did not wish to do anything about tobacco.

Under Secretary Ball asked if HMG would have any problems with economic sanctions in view of the precedent this would create for South Africa. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that this would indeed cause problems.

There was a general discussion of what type of representation the U.S. and the UK should maintain in Southern Rhodesia in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Secretary Rusk said that we were inclined to maintain a consulate there. Mr. Gordon Walker, for his part, thought that the British would probably not be able to keep any kind of representation but his preliminary reaction was that it would be a good idea for the U.S. to keep a consulate. It was agreed this matter would be discussed again later.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Thomas M. Judd and approved in U and S on November 9. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s conference room.
  2. On October 28, the United States issued a statement of support for Prime Minister Wilson’s October 27 message to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith warning the Rhodesian Government of the serious consequences for all Rhodesians if it continued to follow its present course. For text of the U.S. statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 823.