453. Research Memorandum From the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Mozambique: The Status of the Rebellion
The rebellion in Mozambique has intensified since a year ago, but the Portuguese and the rebels are still fighting each other to a standoff. Neither side appears able to break the stalemate in the near future, although unforeseen events could alter the present balance without much warning. We examine below recent developments in the conflict.
Abstract
The Rebellion Goes On. Despite Portuguese claims that the areas of rebel activity have been steadily reduced over the last few years, the rebels are now operating over more of Mozambique than at any time in the past. An incontrovertible fact is that the rebellion has persisted since the first outbreak in September 1964. The Portuguese in Mozambique have resigned themselves to living with insurgency for the indefinite future.
The Tempo Rises. In the first six months of 1968 the rebels significantly increased the number and frequency of their attacks. The effects of their offensive have been reflected in the highest monthly Portuguese casualty rates of the war. But the recent activity may have brought the liberation groups to at least a temporary high water mark. There is evidence that FRELIMO forces in the north are having difficulty extending their campaign more than a moderate distance from their traditional strongholds. In the west COREMO has mounted a few low-level actions north of the Zambezi but will not pose a serious threat unless and until it overcomes a chronic shortage of arms and material. The military stalemate therefore continues.
The Rebels Face Uncertainty. In addition to their difficulties inside Mozambique the liberation groups face an uncertain future as exiles. The strains of a protracted struggle may have adverse effects on their capacity to direct the struggle inside the country. Leadership challenges, tribal rivalries, recruitment problems, diminishing resources, and the limits of tolerance from their host countries—all present potential threats.
The Portuguese are Determined … The Portuguese, too, have problems, but none so serious as to overcome their strong determination to [Page 784] retain Angola and Mozambique intact. Despite some evidence that the war effort has stimulated the economy, military expenditures in Mozambique, as well as those in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, are an undeniable strain on a relatively poor nation, but one so far willingly borne. A more intangible problem may result from one of the strategies adopted to counter the guerrillas—the practice of resettling the African population on the fringes of the war zone in defended villages (aldeamentos). The program has been ostensibly successful to date, but the Portuguese have had to abandon several of the more “exposed” aldeamentos and may be creating resentment among peasants who are forced to abandon their ancestral lands.
On present evidence the Portuguese should be able to maintain the upper hand for some years to come. They were spurred by the outbreak of the African rebellions to invest far more heavily in economic infrastructure than before. Once begun, however, they are proceeding in the confidence that their investments will be returning dividends for a long time. They have the military capability to contain anything less than a major increase in the scale of the insurgency for as long as they are willing to pay the price. Furthermore, present evidence suggests that the liberation groups may be in for a period of increasing internal strife that could damage their ability to prosecute the struggle.
… But So Are the Rebels. Their determination is equal to that of the Portuguese. Despite quarrels and inevitable military setbacks, there is no sign that the rebels are likely to abandon the struggle, or even that the Portuguese can capture their strongholds and reduce them to isolated bands of outlaws.
When Will the Stalemate End? How and when there might be a fundamental change in this situation will probably depend on developments outside Mozambique. Several possible events could unbalance the equation: political change in Portugal that challenged the present government’s commitment to its African policies; an intensification of racial conflict in other areas of southern Africa; a Vietnam settlement favorable to the communists, that might bring about intensified communist aid to African liberation movements and renewed dedication to the idea of “revolutionary warfare;” or a collapse of Portuguese resistance in Portuguese Guinea, where the rebels have made far more substantial inroads than in Mozambique. Any one of these or other, now unforeseen, events might provide a sufficient stimulus to the rebels, or check to the Portuguese, to break the stalemate. Because of this high degree of uncertainty, we cannot estimate when the stalemate will be broken. It could continue for a considerable period of time. It could be ended much sooner.
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- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.↩