Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 25, 1965, 8:02 p.m.

968. USUN’s 1371.² For Ambassador Goldberg.

SC—Portuguese Territories

We have given careful consideration to question how best cope with SC exercise on Portuguese territories scheduled begin October 28. Following general guidance for use at your discretion. Will appreciate receiving your recommendations after you have made soundings with parties and key SC members.

FYI. Ambassador Anderson continued effort in Lisbon on October 22 to ascertain whether any flexibility existed in Portuguese position on principle self-determination for African territories (Deptels 169 and 171 to Lisbon³ and CA 2167⁴). While discussion with Prime Minister Salazar (Lisbon’s 214)⁵ disclosed no substantive change in Portuguese thinking, Salazar assured Ambassador GOP would continue give serious consideration US proposal (Anderson Plan). Anderson Plan as whole is known only to US and GOP and should not be surfaced in SC. Moreover, since self-determination has become sharp election campaign issue in Portugal with GOP asserting advocacy such self-determination by opponents “treasonous,” we not optimistic that Portuguese will be willing show some flexibility. End FYI.

We believe SC meeting does offer opportunity for you follow up on recent discussions in Lisbon and Yost conversation with Slim with a view to promoting our objective of getting a practical dialogue started between the parties at an early date. Tunisian statement that self-determination could cover full range of future options encouraging, though we recognize that Africans following Accra Heads of State conference unlikely depart publicly from position stated November 1963 communique that only purpose resumption talks would be bring about necessary conditions for direct negotiations leading to accession to independence.

We believe that SC res of December 11, 1963,⁶ which included in preamble para “recalling GA resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960”⁷ and went on in para 4 of operative section to reaffirm interpretation of self-determination contained GA res 1514 (XV)⁸ should be used to advance objective of getting discussions underway. It might be possible, for example, for Council to reaffirm these provisions of December 11, 1963 res, thus making clear all options remain open in connection with exercise of self-determination and to call for talks on this basis. You will wish stress with parties, other SC members, and in any statement you make in SC wide range provided by previous SC res, which could meet both African and Portuguese views, and need for parties to get into dialogue on this basis.

We expect Africans will probably press for total arms embargo against Portugal, condemnation of foreign economic interests in territories, appeal to Specialized Agencies to refuse assistance to Portugal, and trade embargo on specific products.

Dept continues oppose proposals for sanctions as inappropriate under Charter except in situation falling within Chapter VII. Portuguese territories problem not within Chapter VII. Also do not favor withholding of assistance by Specialized Agencies, on same ground; there is added technical reason that agreements between SAs and UN contain restrictive clauses requiring prior consultation and in some cases assume Chapter VII situation as condition for acceptance SC recommendations. While we could not agree to total arms embargo in view our NATO commitments, assume you will wish reaffirm our continued adherence to partial arms embargo policy. Formulation along following lines is essence of policy: In order avoid actions of any kind which could further increase tensions in area, we have for number of years followed policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use outside NATO defense area and we have also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to either side for use in Portuguese territories.

In view fact SC meeting scheduled October 28, assume you will wish to see Portuguese and Africans promptly to see whether there is any hope of getting a dialogue going.⁹

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Sisco and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Patricia Byrne; cleared by Fredericks, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon and to The Hague for the Embassy, Leddy, and Ambassador Anderson.
2. Dated October 15. (Ibid., SOC 14 S AFR/UN)
3. Both dated October 19. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT)
4. Document 433.
5. In telegram 214 from Lisbon, October 23, Anderson reported that Salazar had argued that the Portuguese experience indicated that civilization and preparation for self-government of native peoples took much longer than the U.S. Government appeared to believe. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT)
6. For text of Resolution 5481, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on December 11, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 161–162.
7. For text of Resolution 1541, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 15, 1960, see ibid., 1960, pp. 116–118.
8. For text of Resolution 1514, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1960, see ibid., pp. 110–111.
9. Telegram 1592 from USUN, October 27, reported that Ambassador Goldberg met with Foreign Minister Nogueira at the United Nations. Goldberg expressed the U.S. hope that the Portuguese would renew the dialogue with the Africans and leave all options open in defining self-determination. Nogueira responded that he was prepared to renew discussions with the Africans, subject to instructions from Lisbon. He warned, however, that Portugal was small and weak, and that independence would mean the end of Portuguese and Western influence in Angola and Mozambique. Nogueira argued that no Portuguese Government could remain in power for 30 days if it accepted self-determination leading to the kind of results the Africans were seeking. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN)