432. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
PROJECTED COURSE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE REBELLION
On the surface, Mozambique appears to be the southern African area most vulnerable to well-organized guerrilla and terror campaigns. The local Portuguese population is clearly suffering from a state of anticipatory nerves. The Portuguese security services have proved to be inadequately prepared to cope with the intensified intelligence needs resulting from the outbreak of rebel attacks in northern Mozambique. The Portuguese military, while heavily reinforced, are experiencing the normal difficulties of pursuing an elusive enemy over terrain which is relatively more advantageous to rebel movement. In addition, Portuguese troops in Mozambique lack special counter-insurgency training, with the exception of a few experienced units transferred from Angola. Military tactics in Mozambique appear to have emphasized intense and indiscriminate retaliation against local populations at the expense of the loyalty and/or cooperation of hitherto apolitical Africans. The length of the borders, which are contiguous to states which, if not actively hostile, are at least providing sanctuary to rebel groups, itself presents a considerable surveillance problem which the Portuguese are not yet fully equipped to handle. Rebel infiltration from Tanzania and Malawi, therefore, has proved difficult to control.
Rebel groups, however, have developed only a limited offensive capability, are deficient in well-trained officers and, to an even greater extent, have been unable to turn out well-disciplined and trained recruits to carry the burden of the action in Mozambique. FRELIMO, headquartered in Tanzania, is presently by far the most active group militarily. As far as we can determine, FRELIMO has 150–250 men of officer potential, trained in guerrilla tactics for 3–6 month periods in Algeria, the UAR, Communist China, or the USSR. (The number trained in Communist countries is relatively small.) Training of the bulk of recruits is carried on in 2 or 3 camps in Tanzania, under the direction of Mozambican, Tanzanian, and, we understand, Algerian instructors. FRELIMO leaders have admitted the difficulties of training in a matter of weeks raw recruits who lack even a rudimentary understanding of guerrilla tactics. Portuguese military sources have alleged that the rebels lack sure knowledge of the [Page 753] proper use of their weapons and that they frequently abandon their arms at the slightest sign of resistance on the part of the Portuguese.
FRELIMO seems to command adequate arms supplies from the personnel it has sent into the field thus far. Portuguese military officers have indicated that the rebel groups active in northern Mozambique are equipped with modern weapons. FRELIMO public statements claim that the arms are being obtained from friendly African countries. While technically this may be true, it is probable that portions of Russian and, possibly, Chinese Communist arms shipments to Tanzania have been made available to the Mozambicans. The USSR backs FRELIMO in its public media, albeit with a certain amount of reserve. FRELIMO leaders are in frequent contact with Chinese Communist representatives in Dar and Peking.
Of FRELIMO’s rivals, the once vociferous MANU is seldom heard from at present. A recent MANU adherent, Leo Milas—formerly “Defense Secretary” for FRELIMO—claims that MANU has attracted a number of disaffected FRELIMO militants. MANU was apparently responsible for a number of the more primitive guerrilla actions in October and November 1964, but it now seems to be no more than a small political exile organization temporarily based in Kenya.
A second would-be rival, the UDENAMO faction led by Paul Gumane, lays no claim to guerrilla activity in Mozambique. Gumane engaged in abortive merger discussions with FRELIMO leaders in February 1965. Subsequently, UDEMANO’s Vice-President David Mabunda—once FRELIMO Secretary General—either resigned or was expelled from the organization, leaving it with little claim to cohesiveness or power.
The latest entry in the nationalist ranks, a UDENAMO organization led by a Ghanaian protege and suspected Portuguese agent, H. Gwambe, claims to be directing insurgent activities from its headquarters in Lusaka, in coordination with FRELIMO. These claims lack confirmation and appear to be groundless.
Rebel Prospects
There appears to be little doubt that the rebel groups face a long, uphill struggle before they can seriously challenge the Portuguese military or political position in Mozambique. Considerable preparations, training, and planning are required to achieve this goal. At present, the best the rebels seem able to do is to frighten scattered and isolated European settlements in northern Mozambique, keep the military busy with patrolling duties, and inflict casualties at the rate of 1 or 2 every fortnight.
Should there be a change of regime in Malawi, bringing to power a group more wholeheartedly committed to the “liberation” effort, the Portuguese would be required to devote more serious attention to the [Page 754] defense of Mozambique’s borders with Malawi and Tanzania. If this change were accompanied by the beginning of sabotage, strikes, and/or terrorism in Mozambique’s urban areas, the psychological effect would be profound and the retaliation by Portugal on the African population severe. While Tanzania appears fully committed to support of the Mozambique rebels, in practice it is constrained by fears of Portuguese retaliation across the border and distracted by a plethora of domestic problems. Zambia shows no signs of becoming directly involved in support of insurgency.
Portugal’s Economic Status
Metropolitan Portugal, presently entering its second year of a mild economic upturn, shows no signs of suffering from the financial burden of the hostilities in Portuguese Africa. We estimate that Portugal, given its present situation, could quite possibly support defense costs at twice the existing level without too much strain to the economy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; Noforn. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, May 10.↩