416. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts1
SUBJECT
- Portuguese African Territories
FYI: Department and other Government agencies becoming increasingly concerned absence progress toward peaceful resolution issue of Portuguese African territories, the hardening of Portuguese and nationalist positions and obvious danger that as struggle is prolonged, Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements will tend become more violent, radical, racist and less disposed toward compromise and/or transitional settlement. As situation now developing, any independent states that might emerge would be likely experience turbulent beginnings and have anti-Western orientation jeopardizing future stability southern and central Africa. At present there is a breathing space before UN Committee 24 takes up issue again. We would hope utilize pause for constructive private African-Portuguese talks before issue subjected to acrimonious debate. Moreover, given present dissension within GRAE and current challenge to Roberto’s leadership, Africans may feel less inhibited than heretofore in taking initiatives on their own on this issue. Finally, it is in U.S. interest that African-Portuguese talks be resumed in order to obviate, or at least postpone, head on African-Portuguese collision. End FYI.
It is accordingly requested that, unless objections perceived thereto, action addressee post discuss this problem at highest appropriate level along following lines:
Reiterate U.S. Government’s grave concern regarding absence any forward movement toward settlement. Both Portuguese and nationalists now appear to rely on force as primary means to obtain respective objectives. Both positions rigid thus undermining any chances for peaceful solution. At same time longer the Angolan struggle drags on, the more it will become an increasingly festering sore on large area of continent and be susceptible to influences extraneous to African interests.
[Page 723]It seems to us resumption African-Portuguese talks under UN auspices should be attempted. We aware disillusionment with last discussions and absence any certainty new talks would be fruitful. We also realize Roberto reportedly opposed, as Portuguese probably are, and that Portuguese refusal to date to accept publicly UN definition self-determination poses for Africans formidable obstacle to getting into substantive discussions. At same time it remains our conviction Africans should not give up and instead should persist in exploiting talks, particularly in view advantages of having them under UN auspices. Latter provides unique forum for setting forth reasonableness of demands for self-determination and for showing that Africans disposed explore any and every avenue for negotiations leading to peaceful settlement. Will be recalled that December 11, 1963 SC resolution included all options for self-determination, as well as providing for UN SYG to continue efforts and report June 1.
Another possibility which seems to us merits exploring is for certain Africans put out feelers to Salazar or Franco Nogueira with view engaging Portuguese in secret bilateral talks on issue. Possibly chances for some progress more likely in this context.
In any event we would appreciate host government’s assessment present situation, prospects for progress and particularly its thoughts on foregoing or any other approaches that might be appropriate and effective. We for our part continue our quiet efforts induce GOP accept and implement principle self-determination. Also, we have programs for relief of Angolan refugees and for educating Mozambican and Angolan refugee students.
However seems to us this issue principally of African concern and thus appropriate and desirable that African statesmen take lead in trying bring about solution. Curious in this connection that as far as we aware little attention focused on this issue during Lagos OAU meetings. UN debates important and useful forum for pressing African views. However this only one approach. Moreover we doubtful periodic acrimonious debates in public likely advance issue, especially if not supplemented by continuing African diplomatic initiatives in meantime.
FYI: While we would be interested in any information volunteered regarding current reports of internal dissension within GRAE or host government’s views on Holden Roberto’s leadership, including possibilities a different GRAE lineup might have better chance of negotiating with GOP, preferable you yourself not be drawn into discussion this question. If queried as to U.S. views, you should make clear while internal politics GRAE may justifiably be of concern to Africans, not appropriate matter for non-Africans to meddle in. End FYI.
For Abidjan: Leave to your discretion how you believe matter should be discussed with Houphouet-Boigny this juncture, given fact he has already [Page 724] made efforts along above lines and our desire while trying to generate bilateral African-Portuguese talks, that GOP not gain impression this is U.S. inspired idea.
For African Diplomatic Posts listed as info addressees: Please advise telegraphically should you believe would be useful for you also to discuss this issue with host government.
FYI: We planning make comparable approach to GOP. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Looram on March 10; cleared by IO/UNP, Francois M. Dickman of NEA, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros; and approved by Williams. Sent to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Monrovia, Ouagadougou, Rabat, Tananarive, and Tunis. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, Paris, all other African diplomatic posts including Cairo, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Salisbury, Lusaka, and Blantyre.↩