383. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1

8348. Ref: State 179138.2 Emb shares Dept’s concern over deteriorating Nigerian situation. We have consulted with UK HICOM on proposals for joint intervention set forth in reftel and we agree that any such initiative at this time would not only be resented but probably rebuffed especially by Gowon’s closest supporters and advisers. Feeling among FMG members is said to be that each admonishment by US and UK is in effect a request that FMG accept each new provocation of Ojukwu without reacting; and thus serves to prove to FMG that US and UK pro-East. [Page 652] Several sources close to FMG have indicated that SMC members have become very impatient with external intervention in present situation. Yesterday Edward Enahoro, number three officer in Extaff (who very pro-West and has English wife) informed UK diplomat that FMG fed up with outside gratuitous advice and mentioned US and UK in particular. Embassy, therefore, reluctantly concludes that only outside intervention which likely to receive consideration now is that of the Emperor (Addis 3749).3 We further conclude as result of information contained in Datt 1130 and ANL 15524 that FMG no longer interested in Aburi Two and that today’s meeting of SMC likely to be decisive on courses of action to be pursued by FMG against Eastern acts of insurrection. Information available UK HICOM basically confirms reports transmitted in above messages.

Mathews
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Accra, Addis Ababa, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, NSA, CIA, and USIA.
  2. Telegram 179138 to Lagos, April 20, reported the Department’s concern over the possibility that the FMG might try to isolate the Ibos by breaking up the East into mini-states, with the Ibos in the center, before a possible Aburi or comparable meeting could alleviate the FMG-East dispute. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegrams 3749 and 3752 from Addis Ababa, April 21, reported Emperor Haile Selassie’s intention to send telegrams to Ankrah and the Nigerian FMG. (Ibid.)
  4. Not further identified.