Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

334. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 75/76–67

Washington, April 27, 1967.

PROSPECTS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Problem

To estimate the implications for the US, over the next two or three years, of growing instability in Ethiopia, Somali expansionism, and the activities in the Horn of Africa of the USSR and certain Arab states.

Conclusions

A. The likelihood of growing instability in Ethiopia, including the emergency of a potent insurgency in Eritrea, will raise problems for US interests in the Horn of Africa and call into question the future of the US position in Kagnew Station. Haile Selassie will probably retain control of the government and hold the Empire intact as long as he remains reasonably active. We believe, however, that the death or overthrow of the 74-year-old Emperor will usher in a period of prolonged uncertainty, and perhaps violence, in Addis Ababa. In the latter event, government forces would, at least for a time, be unable to maintain control throughout the countryside, and some regions might break away. (Paras. 1–15, 39–42)

B. Somali expansionism will continue to aggravate the tensions in the Horn among antagonistic ethnic and religious groups. The Somalia Government will probably continue to avoid provoking a full-scale confrontation with Ethiopia’s superior military forces. It will persist, however, in its assistance to dissident groups in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, in hopes of speeding the collapse of the Empire and improving the prospects for obtaining the Ogaden without open warfare. (Paras. 16–20, 35, 37–38)

C. Though French security forces in French Somaliland will probably keep any Somali resistance movement from getting out of hand, agitation in one form or another is likely to keep the territory’s political and economic affairs unsettled. The French will probably withdraw from the territory by 1970 or so, and perhaps earlier. Since the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia will persist, the danger of a war over Djibouti will again arise. (Paras. 21–24, 36)

D. The USSR, particularly through its military assistance to Somalia, seeks to expand its influence in the Horn and to undermine the special US position in Ethiopia. The USSR apparently believes that the trend of events in the Horn and the Red Sea area generally is running in its favor and will probably be cautious about premature exploitation of the disruptive forces emerging there. The UAR is also seeking to extend its influence in the Horn, but the size of its activities is limited by the strain on its resources of its involvement in Yemen and by its desire not to disrupt diplomatic relations with Haile Selassie. (Paras. 2, 25–31, 43–44)

E. The persistence of tensions in the Horn and disorders within Ethiopia will prompt Haile Selassie to demand increased military assistance from the US—the quid pro quo for Kagnew. As long as the Emperor remains in charge, however, the Ethiopian Government is not likely to alter sharply the conditions of our use of the facility, though it may at some time demand new status of forces arrangements. After he leaves the scene, Kagnew will probably become increasingly a focus of political attention in Ethiopia. At the least, the cost of our rights there will increase substantially, and there might be a demand to renegotiate the basic Kagnew agreement. (Paras. 33, 45, 47)

F. So far, the Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, but pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are bound to increase. If Eritrea were to gain independence, the US might not be cast out of Kagnew automatically. The reaction of the new government would depend in part on its susceptibility to radical foreign influences and the availability of alternate sources of foreign aid. (Paras. 12, 46)

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1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 27.