Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

325. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

I–20738/67

Washington, February 4, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia

Emperor Haile Selassie is scheduled to meet with President Johnson on 14 February 1967. The meeting is in response to the Emperor’s urgent request to express personally his grave concerns for Ethiopia’s security. He will point out UAR and Soviet advances in the Red Sea basin and emphasize the Soviet-supported Somali threat to Ethiopian security. In addition to seeing the President, the Emperor has asked to see you and Governor Harriman at Blair House.

In preparation for the visit, the Ethiopians have submitted a list of major equipment requirements totaling well over $150 million (including tanks, APCs, antitank and anti-aircraft guns, C–130s, F–5s and helicopters. STRIKECOM has done a comprehensive study of the Ethiopian military capabilities, requirements and the probable threats facing Ethiopia. It is STRIKECOM’s judgment and the Joint Staff’s that the well-balanced Ethiopian forces will be capable of coping with present and future external threats without an increase in forces and major armaments. They see that the main Ethiopian needs as being in the fields of training and logistics. They also see a need, however, for helicopters (to which the Ethiopians attach the highest priority) and, at a later time, transport aircraft.

Our objectives during HIM’s visit are to say “no” to his equipment demands and still preserve our good relations with him. If we fail on the latter point, we will run a real risk of unsettling the satisfactory arrangement under which we use Kagnew Station, a key communications-intelligence facility at Asmara. We must do what we can to demonstrate to the Emperor that we are truly interested in Ethiopia’s security and we are responsive where his needs are real. In the latter regard, we plan to speed up deliveries of certain key items already programmed under MAP (e.g. APCs and vehicles). We would also propose to furnish four UH–1D helicopters (instead of eight as requested by the Emperor) as soon as Ethiopian crews could be trained (eight-ten months). These are the only two positive gestures that could be made without substantially increasing the level of MAP. The addition of four UH–1Ds and several other minor items would mean an increase of about $1 million each in the FY 1967 and FY 1968 programs.

The Chief of Staff of the Army does not concur with the provision of four UH–1D helicopters. Although there would be no need to divert the aircraft from Vietnam units or those scheduled to deploy to Vietnam, the Chief of Staff is concerned about the shortage of engines for the UH-type helicopters. He recommends that all current and future production of the UH-type helicopters be retained under US Army control at least until 1968 to hold as a reserve for Southeast Asia requirements.

Against the contingency foreseen by the Army Chief of Staff, we must weigh the risk of being unresponsive to the Emperor in an area where he has a genuine need. STRIKECOM, J–5 and the State Department share our view that an offer of four UH–1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained (eight-ten months) is the minimum response we should make.

Accordingly, I recommend² that—

(1) You approve an offer of four UH–1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained.³

(2) You agree to the Emperor’s request that you meet with him at Blair House. (Alternate times for your consideration are 1530, 14 February or 0945, 15 February.)⁴

John T. McNaughton

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 333 Ethiopia. Secret.
2. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “I make this recommendation solely to provide the President and you with one ‘goodie.’ If the Emperor were not visiting us, I would not recommend providing the UH–1Ds.”
3. McNamara initialed his approval on February 6.
4. On February 6, McNamara initialed his approval for a meeting at 1630 on February 14, with the handwritten notation, “The time should be 1630 as I may be testifying.”