320. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- US-Somali Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Abdirazak Hagi Hussen, Somali Prime Minister
- Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh, Somali Foreign Minister
- Ahmed Mohamed Adan, Somali Ambassador to US
- Abdurahman Abby Farah, Somali Acting Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ismail Kahin, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
- Matthew Looram, Country Director, AF:AFNE
The Secretary said that just before his departure for the Far East this morning, the President had asked him to send his wishes to the Somali Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister stated he had hoped very much to see the President. He went on to say that over the past three years Somali-US relations had been good, although there were some problems on the horizon. The US seemed to believe that the Somali Government had made its mistake when it sought arms from the USSR for defense and has wrongly interpreted this move as an aggressive intention. The press had also persisted in putting Somalia in a very unfavorable light in this regard by exaggerating the extent of Soviet arms deliveries. The purpose of obtaining these arms, which were of a modest amount, was solely for self-defense in light of the Ethiopian military build-up over many years. The recent delivery to Ethiopia of US supersonic jets, in addition to all the other arms, had bothered the Somalis very much. Nevertheless, the Government of Somalia has tried to maintain friendly relations with the United States Government and has eschewed making public attacks on arms deliveries to Ethiopia. Moreover, the US seemed to consider that Somalia was relatively unimportant in comparison with its neighbors, and, of course, the US had no vital interest in the country. It is hoped that this impression was not true, but there was some feeling that the USG had decided at the time of the Somali-Soviet military agreement of 1963 to “hold up” aid to Somalia. It seemed to the Prime Minister that the USG should take more interest in Somalia and not leave the field to its enemies. The US did not [Page 552] realize its own power, seemed to have a “complex” about Communism and appeared unduly sensitive to the Soviets coming into any area.
The Secretary stated that the US wished to have good relations with Somalia and to see Somalia safe, prosperous and independent. If the Ethiopian Government should move across its frontiers into Somalia, all of the United Nations, including the US, would be with Somalia, and vice-versa. There was no US policy to extend its influence in the area by means of a third country. We were satisfied with Somalia’s position of non-alignment and wished to be friends with all the states in the region. It was unfortunate that we were dragged into the disputes between these countries, with all of whom we were on friendly terms.
The Secretary stated that the United States Government regretted very much the escalation of the arms race in the area, and attached great importance to the need for regional understanding on the level of armaments. Otherwise the escalation would continue with unpredictable results, and the economic burden would increase. As to the Soviet aspect, the Secretary stated that the Soviet Union had made substantial shipments of arms to such countries as the UAR, Syria and Algeria, creating a great sense of insecurity in those regions. He was concerned by a similar development in Somalia. Possibly we did have a “complex” regarding Soviet activities; the cost to the US in money and lives as a result of Soviet activities since World War II had been enormous.
The Secretary added that there was no policy of “holding up” assistance to Somalia. There were admittedly problems as a result of the Congress’ reduction in appropriations and limitation on the number of recipient countries. Moreover, we would like to see some reduction in the arms race. At the outbreak of Pakistan-India hostilities, the Congress had come very close to enacting legislation prohibiting all assistance to these two countries. Moreover, the West European countries should assume greater responsibility with regard to aid to African countries. US resources were limited, and from a Somalia political point of view, it might be prudent for the Somali Government to have a broad pattern of bilateral assistance.
The Somali Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for his views but still felt Somalia was not getting its full share of US assistance. The relative size of the population of Ethiopia as compared to Somalia had been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the US and others had some responsibility for the arms race in the area. As far back as 1960, the time of Somali independence, Ethiopia created a security problem for Somalia by already having three Army divisions and the Bodyguard. Moreover, Ethiopia did not need to cross any frontier in order to treat the Somali people in a savage and provocative manner. It was not long ago that Somalia’s territory was penetrated by Ethiopia bulldozers building a road. The Ethiopians subsequently found they were wrong when the [Page 553] location of the frontier was ascertained but, of course, refused to admit it. The US supply of arms and particularly the F–5s to Ethiopia compelled the Somali Government to rectify the situation. They had not tried to get similar Soviet planes, but would certainly have been justified in doing so. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Prime Minister admitted that they had obtained “a very few MIGs.”
The Secretary concluded by saying that the United States Government hoped very much that all these problems might be settled by talks between the parties concerned in a spirit of goodwill.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Looram of AFNE on October 19 and approved in S on October 26. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office.↩