27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria1

1806. Ref: (A) Algiers 1336;2 (B) Algiers 1337.3 For Ambassador from Governor Williams.

1.
Department appreciates line you took with Yaker as described Ref A. I intend call in Guellal to express our equally strong reaction to Moscow communique and to request explanation of how Algerian positions therein can be reconciled with earlier Algerian assurances to us of desire improved relations on basis mutual respect.
2.
We do not wish at this time link aid negotiations with recent Algerian performance on Vietnam. However, we hope soon be able assess meaning of Moscow visit and acquire further information on any aid or other arrangements that might have been concluded in Moscow. We also wish gauge Algerian reaction to concern we expect to take with Guellal. Embassy need not break off discussions pending this review but they should be kept in low key.
3.
We would appreciate as much light as you can shed on Algerian intentions on future relations with the U.S. following Moscow trip. You authorized in your discretion see Boumedienne, or anyone else in government, for this purpose.4
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Root and Tron of AFN, cleared by Nelson of AID, and approved by Williams.
  2. In telegram 1336 from Algiers, December 20, Ambassador John D. Jernegan reported that he had met with Layachi Yaker, Director of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Affairs Division of the Algerian Foreign Office, to discuss the state of the U.S.-Algerian aid negotiations, and had told him “bluntly” that the joint communique issued at the end of Boumedienne’s trip to Moscow with its long list of grievances against the United States did not make his efforts to improve relations between the two countries easier. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–4 ALG)
  3. Dated December 20. (Ibid., POL 7 ALG)
  4. In telegram 1368 from Algiers, December 24, Jernegan reported that he did not think he should seek a special appointment with Boumedienne or Bouteflika to discuss this, since the essential point had already been made to Yaker who had promised to convey it to Bouteflika. He noted that there was nothing to indicate that any significant new arrangements for aid had been concluded in Moscow, and argued that it would be a mistake for the United States to break off its own aid negotiations unless there was some evidence that the communique would be followed by unacceptable Algerian actions. (Ibid., POL ALG–US)