124. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Moroccan King Hassan plans to come to the UN General Assembly in late November or early December and has asked whether he could drop down to see you. The normal procedure if you see a head of state visiting the UN is just to have him for lunch and an hour’s talk. We have told our ambassadors to discourage these visitors from expecting to see you, and we do not have any reason to expect any heavy influx this fall.
I think this would be a good way to handle Hassan since we are not ready to invite him for another official visit. He has angled for a meeting ever since you took office, and we have stalled him off each time. During his 1963 state visit, President Kennedy made a special effort to get close to him because we wanted him to let us stay on in our communications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] base after closing our SAC bases. Hassan wants to feel equally close to you.
My first inclination was to discourage this because you tentatively have two visitors each in November and December. He might not even come to the UN if he were not sure of seeing you at the same time. However, an hour’s talk and a lunch might save you a more formal visit next year. He is one of the moderate Arab-Africans we want to support. He has been good on Vietnam and moderate on Israel. He has kept his word on our communications base. He has closed out Soviet military aid (though he probably will make a long-deferred Moscow visit early this fall).
A larger reason for seeing him is that this, coupled with Bourguiba’s visit early next year, will give you a good crack at troublesome North Africa. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are a natural grouping for economic cooperation. Oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sahara are ripe for common exploitation. One thing holds them back—Algeria. While Boumedienne is less menacing than Ben Bella was, neither Bourguiba nor Hassan trust him with his Soviet-equipped army, and we are fighting to keep out of an arms race there. We want to encourage these countries to work together, and Ambassador Korry will be giving you some suggestions in a couple of days in reporting on your African program. This would give you a chance to weigh in.
I recommend you authorize Ambassador Tasca to tell the King you would hope to see him if he comes to the UN. But we would tell Tasca to [Page 184] explain your especially heavy schedule this fall and ask to defer making definite plans until later.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret.↩
- Telegram 14058 to Rabat, July 23, instructed Tasca to tell King Hassan that if he came to the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly in late November or early December, the President would be happy to entertain him at luncheon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR) Following the President’s operation in early November, King Hassan canceled his trip to the United Nations, and his visit to the United States was tentatively postponed until January or February 1967.↩
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