Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–67–65

Washington, January 29, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance for Morocco (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed recent developments in North Africa and consider that the military imbalance being created in Algeria, vis-a-vis Morocco, can become a positive threat to the peace of the area. If current trends continue, it is estimated that the Algerian military establishment will probably be superior to that of Morocco in about a year. The Algerian military buildup has reached the point that the Government of Morocco feels it is again seriously threatened and, accordingly, has requested the United States to provide additional military assistance, including fighter aircraft. The US Ambassador to Morocco has recommended that the United States plan a five-year military assistance program for the Moroccan armed forces, coordinated with, but separate from, French and Spanish aid programs.

2. The Moroccans are justifiably concerned with events taking place in Algeria, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the situation which is developing could have important implications for US security interests, not only in the Mediterranean area, but in all of Africa. Soviet and Chinese communist influence throughout Africa is increasing, and Algerian policies, such as the aid she is providing the Congolese rebels, parallel communist interests. It is important that the United States remain responsive to the legitimate security requirements of friendly African states, particularly those, such as Morocco, which occupy strategic locations on the continent.

3. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff must reserve their position on Ambassador Ferguson’s estimate of Moroccan military requirements pending further study, they concur with his recommendation that the United States should undertake an increased military assistance program to Morocco in order to counter the growing Algerian threat. Such a program should take into consideration Morocco’s economic limitations and must be closely coordinated with the Spanish and French, on whom the Moroccans must remain primarily dependent for military aid. This action could be significant, not only in thwarting communist infiltration and in retaining US influence in a strategic area of the world, but also as a means of obtaining overflight privileges and perhaps eventually regaining the use of one of the US-constructed air bases in Morocco. The availability of an alternate air base in Morocco which could provide landing, refueling, minor maintenance, and limited war readiness materiel (WRM) storage facilities in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements would be most desirable. Such a base would provide direct access to the West Coast of Africa from the Azores and Europe and would provide additional and/or back-up facilities to those available in Spain, the Canary Islands, and Libya.

4. It is recognized that, despite possible Moroccan receptivity to such a proposal, anticipation of political and propaganda pressures, such as those brought to bear on the Government of Libya relative to Wheelus, will probably militate against Morocco openly granting unrestricted base rights to the United States. It may be feasible, however, to obtain more limited use of a base in Morocco as a storage/staging facility, possibly under the cover of a US military mission, similar to the recent CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal regarding the use of Dhahran Airfield.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must, in its own security interests, become more responsive and more committed to selected nations on the African continent. Toward this end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Early favorable consideration be given to an increased military assistance program for Morocco, consistent with her requirements and resources, and the transfer of additional AID funds to MAP.

b. As recommended by Ambassador Ferguson, joint discussions be undertaken with the Moroccans, and with the French and Spanish as appropriate, to determine specific Moroccan military requirements and ways and means of satisfying those requirements.

c. During such discussions, the Department of State attempt to ascertain Moroccan receptivity to a proposal for the reactivation of one of the relinquished air bases as a US base or, at a minimum, as a storage/staging facility in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements. However, these discussions should not prejudice the establishment of the program as recommended in subparagraph 5 a, above.

d. A memorandum substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto,² be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.J. Kirn ³
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.