10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1
2461. Following is based on uncleared memcon of Secretary’s talk with Ambassador Guellal June 16,2 subject to revision on review, and not to be discussed with foreign nationals:
In answer Secretary’s request, Amb Guellal outlined present GOA viewpoint on Algeria and US-Algerian relations. He maintained Algerian problems and attitudes had to be viewed in light history of struggle since 1954 and political leadership crisis of 1962. Algeria still suffering from political vacuum caused by refusal opposition leaders join GOA despite fact Ben Bella not “rigid” toward them. Internally, Ben Bella had taken necessary steps such as expropriation of foreign-held land and movement toward greater state control industrial sector but admittedly had not been entirely successful to date. Economic situation remained serious, unemployment high, Algerian emigration to France had assumed alarming proportions, and country hampered by lack of trained personnel. Problem now uppermost in minds of regime was trouble in Kabylia fomented and nurtured by opposition.
Turning to external relations, Guellal said Algeria’s policy was one of non-alignment. Difficulties with Morocco appeared on way to resolution, Algerian-Tunisian relations quite good, relations proceeding well with France which understood Algeria’s problems including need for greater oil revenues. Re other Arab states, Algerian policy was try to be helpful in narrowing differences among them.
Guellal said GOA aware of US concern re Ben Bella’s visit to USSR. Visit was, however, normal outgrowth of long-standing Russian invitation. Algerians had prepared thoroughly for it including consultations with other visitors to USSR and recipients of Russian aid. Algeria made clear its intention remain aloof from Soviet-Chicom dispute and its identification with neutral outlook of OAU.
Guellal added unfortunately US-Algerian relations were not what GOA had hoped for. GOA felt US had not taken sufficient account of Algeria’s social, economic and political problems resulting from revolution. Wheat program useful but did not contribute to Algeria’s great need for development projects without which country could not progress. Soviets on other hand promptly selected and studied projects they were interested in and six months later had agreed to begin program.
[Page 27]Guellal said “on top of everything else” there had emerged, rightly or wrongly, suspicion in minds Algerians that CIA engaged in anti-regime activities in Kabylia and had contacted opposition in Zurich last August. As result Ben Bella had developed feeling US was hostile to Algeria as well as unsympathetic with its problems. This feeling given further substance by Fascell report. Guellal said Algiers had become scene of free-for-all among pro-Soviets, pro-Chinese, pro-Westerners, etc. In these circumstances, those like himself attempting “balance” political climate in Algiers by representing US point of view having very difficult time of it.
Secretary observed US found Algerian accusations against CIA frustrating. There was no truth whatever to them3 and no evidence forthcoming from GOA despite our declared willingness look into matter.
Secretary said he would soon be going before Senate Foreign Relations Committee re foreign aid bill and might well be asked two questions. First was, what does Algeria mean by non-alignment? Algerian official press had only that morning spoken of US “policy of aggression” in SE Asia, and Ben Bella still seemed curiously fascinated by Castro. US had much experience with and was sympathetic to non-alignment and knew what it meant. Did Algeria?
Guellal replied that to Algeria non-alignment did not mean remaining exactly equidistant between two points. It had to be admitted differences of viewpoints between US and Algeria substantial on many issues. Current Algerian views on Korea and Vietnam (where, incidentally, many Algerians still residing following their service with French army in Indo-China) were same as those Algerian leaders had defended since 1954. It was unrealistic expect that two years after independence Algeria would alter its views these matters and recast its position on non-alignment. Algeria still in state of flux, and process of maturing could be expected last many years. Guellal said he felt it was not constructive make issues of such questions although he could understand US sensitivities regarding them.
Secretary said he readily understood nation could in principle oppose stationing of troops in foreign countries. However, he could not subscribe to view that in Vietnam, for example, presence of foreign Communist troops acceptable but presence American troops was not. Secretary said problems such as Vietnam were issues of war and peace and thus obviously not only sensitive but of great importance to US.
[Page 28]Secretary said second question Senators could ask him related to Ben Bella’s reference to American wheat aid as “poisoned bread”. Secretary asked Guellal how he thought average American paying taxes, part of which supported this program, would react to such as insulting description of our aid. Guellal said he agreed words were unjustified and that he had reported US reaction this matter to Ben Bella.
Secretary observed US-Algerian relations now in descending spiral. Question was could both sides cooperate to reverse trend or not? Most he would be able to say in answer to Senators, in absence any explanation from GOA, was that in his opinion it did not make any real difference what Algeria thought. Of course such remark would not be appreciated by Ben Bella but there appeared to be little else that could be said.
Guellal said he could assure Secretary that Ben Bella harbored good intentions toward US and France. It would have been easy cut Algeria off from both countries at time of independence when feeling against them running high. Ben Bella had, however, wanted start new page in these relations.
Secretary said US had entertained high hopes for understanding relations with Algeria during time of President Kennedy, but unfortunately it had not proved possible build on these hopes. Although US wheat program was one of largest in world, it apparently not helpful in our relations.
Guellal asserted food program had helped Algerian people. Nevertheless it was not of economic reconstruction type that would help put Algeria on its feet. Guellal said Ben Bella, he and others had been obliged intervene with certain GOA ministries which opposed US work projects. Ben Bella had finally agreed intervene in favor of projects in interest maintaining good relations with US. Guellal said he agreed US-Algerian relations heading downhill and there was no doubt GOA had developed suspicions re US intentions toward Algeria.
Secretary said he believed it was important in interest better US-Algerian relations to clear up matter of allegations against CIA. He wondered whether US and Algerian Governments might each select person in whom it had utmost confidence to conduct quietly and discreetly joint investigation of true origin and facts concerning these reports. Guellal promised convey this thought to Ben Bella.
Mr. Tasca emphasized US concern over denuclearization conference and especially indications conference had official GOA support. Guellal said he would again report US concern to Algiers.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus in AFN, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris.↩
- The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL ALG–US.↩
- Telegram 21 to Algiers, July 2, stated that Secretary Rusk had instructed that, in view of the assurances he had given to Ambassador Guellal that U.S. officials were not in contact with Algerian opposition elements, there be no contact by State, CIA, Service attaches, or other members of the U.S. establishment with Colonel Chabaani. (Ibid., POL 9 ALG–US)↩