Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

72. Telegram From the Consulate in Aden to the Department of State ¹

Aden, May 18, 1966, 0345Z.

147. Contel 145.² South Arabian Search for a Security Guaranty.

1. Foreign Minister Farid told me May 17 his government has not yet given up hope of securing post-independence defense agreement with UK. He leaves May 20 to join South Arabian delegation which will argue this point as well as negotiate for military assistance.

2. Farid criticized Wilson and Beswick for playing politics in Commons—twisting words of South Arabian ministers in their efforts to get off the hook on which Sandys has impaled them.

3. Farid asked my personal reaction to suggestion that, if UKG adheres to its decision to terminate defense agreement with independence, SAFG ask it to intercede in interest of defense agreement from US.³

4. I expressed personal view that USG, unlike UKG, has endeavored to maintain constructive relations with both extremist and moderate states in Near East and to this end sought to minimize special ties with any one faction. USG had not signed defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, and would be unlikely to do so with any other Near Eastern state.

5. However, repeated statements on UAR intentions toward Saudi Arabia showed US refusal to tolerate aggression from any quarter.

6. Farid observed that it would be very helpful if US could make similar statements with specific reference to South Arabia.

7. I expressed view that USG is further inhibited from categorical statements of this nature by difficulty in distinguishing between aggression and intervention in civil war—as UAR has done in Yemen. (Later in conversation, in a different context, Farid said Aden would undoubtedly fall under UAR influence if Egyptian troops remained in Yemen after South Arabian independence.)

8. Farid inquired about US attitude toward latest Egyptian wheat request. I said as far as I knew no decision had been taken. USG recognized that continued wheat shipments could be construed as encouragement to UAR to stay in Yemen, from which it could threaten SAF. Whereas cutting off wheat sales might bring UAR to terms, it might also force UARG into taking desperate actions detrimental to interests of more than one country.

9. Farid said he felt UARG would have to give in to US pressure unless Soviet Union bailed them out—an unlikely prospect. I suggested that much depended on what Soviets stood to gain; Aden Radio had repeated rumors of Soviet request for naval base in Egypt. Farid said he hoped UARG would grant Soviets a base and thus expose the hollowness of their claim to being neutral.

10. In any event, Farid concluded, he was not personally disturbed. If the Egyptian troops stay in Yemen, he could easily take refuge in his home state. What he regretted was that continued Egyptian presence in Yemen would undoubtedly destroy the South Arabian Federation.

Jones

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Dated May 18. (Ibid.)
3. Circular telegram 2452, June 13, transmitted press guidance for embassies to use in response to questions regarding a newspaper report that the South Arabian Federation was planning to ask the U.S. Government for a security guarantee. The guidance stated that no such request had been received, quoted President Kennedy’s May 8, 1963, statement that the United States was “strongly opposed to the use of force or threat of force in the Near East,” and expressed the hope that the people of South Arabia would be successful in setting up a government with the broadest possible base when becoming independent in 1968. (Ibid.)